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A NEOCONVENTIONAL TRADEMARK RÉGIME
FOR "NEWCOMER" STATES
Amir H. Khoury*
INTRODUCTION
This research constitutes a (natural) follow-up to an earlier published
research paper in which I assessed, through data analysis, the effects of the
Paris-TRIPS Conventional Trademark Régime (“CTR”) on countries.1 In
that research I devised and applied the Trademark Potential concept.
Using that concept I demonstrated that if a country has an inherent
Trademark Deficit because of the structure of its industry, the CTR cannot
effectively benefit that country's economy. My empirically-based research
has shown that the Trademark Potential of a country is not contingent upon
its laws’ compatibility with CTR. I have established that CTR compliant
laws do not necessarily facilitate market entry for newcomers originating in
developing countries. Thus, in that research I have refuted the existence of
some of the benefits that are generally associated with CTR.
This present research is geared towards considering various avenues
for remedying the pitfalls of the CTR by introducing a NeoConventional
Trademark Régime (“NCTR”). The aim of this proposed régime would be
to facilitate the creation and market entry of brands originating in
developing countries into their respective national markets and beyond. In
this regard, this research constitutes the culmination of my earlier research
because it transcends the diagnostic role pertaining to the CTR and
ventures into the realm of offering workable solutions thereto.

* Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law. This article was written while I was
a Cegla Fellow. My sincere thanks go to the Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of
the Law at the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, for its support of this research project.
I also thank Hanoch Dagan, Ariel Porat, Michael Birnhack, Assaf Likhovski, Katya Assaf,
Martin Adelman, Neil Wilkof and Guy Pessach for their valuable comments and ideas.
1. Amir H. Khoury, “Measuring the Immeasurable”—The Effects of Trademark
Regimes: A Case Study of Arab Countries, 26 J.L. & COM. 11, 11 (2006-2007).
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SECTION ONE: A CATALYST FOR THE RESEARCH
For some decades now, literature has produced contradictory views as
to the effects of “global” intellectual property protection on developing
countries. While this concern has been widely recognized in the context of
patents, it has been less discernible in the trademark sphere.2 Generally, in
the latter field the core of this body of research has been about enhancing
the competitiveness of developing countries through the utilization of
national trademark law. Here, the proponents of the adoption of present
day (conventional) standards of trademark protection contend that those
constitute an essential tool for stimulating commercial activity and fair
dealing.3 This position is based on the Modernization (Development)
theory, according to which non-industrialized countries can only develop
through the adoption of norms that have been created by developed
countries.4 It follows that developing countries should adopt the legal
norms and standards of trademark protection that have ultimately helped in
2. See generally Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local
Innovation?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 309 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005) (suggesting that stronger intellectual property rights may not
stimulate local innovation, but rather can lead to welfare losses in developing countries that
strengthen their IP regimes, as well as more rapid deployment of technology generated in
the world’s research centers); Heinz Klug, Comment: Access to essential medicines–
Promoting human rights over free trade and intellectual property claims, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME, supra, at 481 (arguing that in the debate over access to medicines there
is a need to view the relationship between the different sources of law governing human
rights, trade, and intellectual property rights in terms of the broader normative goals of
international legal order); Timothy Swanson and Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution:
The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological Enforcement within the Biotechnology
Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra, at 669, 670 (“Technological
enforcement of proprietary rights in biotechnological innovations will result in uniformly
and universally enforced rights in those innovations. These rights should generate enhanced
returns to innovation, but at the cost of reduced rates of diffusion.”).
3. See Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting
“Irrational Beliefs”, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007) (concluding in part that producers
should be able to command different prices for physically identical products bearing
different marks without being subject to antitrust liability or inquiry).
4. See ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES 6 (1996) (commenting that supporters of the “modernization” approach consider
it to be the only viable choice for those nations aspiring for industrialization and
technological transformation). In this context, a “development” theory rationalization might
be that it is only a matter of time before developing brands catch up with other brands of
industrial countries because developing brands and marks are a relatively recent
phenomenon, unlike many of the American counterparts that have emerged almost a century
ago. Id. Many of the well-known American brands in use today emerged very early on in
the past century. Id.
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advancing developed countries to where they are today.5 Others do not
accept this view and submit that in the case of developing countries, the
trademark system merely benefits foreign brand owners.
Here,
Dependency theorists contend that applying modern standards of trademark
protection to developing countries will render those countries evermore
dependent on foreign brands and would not help generate new local
brands.6
1.1 The "Law in Action" and the "Trademark Potential" Concept
This present research constitutes a (natural) follow-up to an earlier
published research paper in which I examined, through data analysis, the
effects of the Conventional Trademark Régime (as embodied in the ParisTRIPS system) on countries.7 In that research I argued that the effects of
the Conventional Trademark Régime (“CTR”) should be assessed within
the parameters of the Trademark Potential concept. According to that
concept, the Trademark Potential of a country is contingent on the type of
industry therein, and not on the level of compliance of its trademark law
with norms and standards that are prescribed by the CTR. To substantiate
my claims, I presented empirical evidence highlighting the lack of national
utilization of trademark laws in developing countries. From my previous
research I have been able to draw the following conclusions:
1) Developing countries lag behind developed countries in all
spheres of trademark use, namely the “Absolute,” “Relative,” and
“Particular.”
Specifically, developing countries are at a
disadvantage in terms of actual (Absolute) trademark registration
both within their respective jurisdictions and beyond. Not only is
the number of registrations much smaller than the comparable
numbers in developed countries, but also the “relative” share of
non-resident owned marks that are registered in developing
countries is much higher than the share of non-resident
registrations in developed countries. Furthermore, the “particular
level” indicates that brands originating in developed countries
dominate “foreign registrations” in developing countries.
Significantly, my findings indicate a consistent pattern since the
1970s.

5. As such, achieving their own growth is very tempting to developing countries.
6. See Daniel Chudnovsky, Foreign Trademarks in Developing Countries, 7 WORLD
DEV. 663 (1979) (arguing that trademarks used by foreign manufacturers in developing
countries force domestic enterprises to either accept a reduced share of the market or enter
into license agreements with the foreign manufacturers, the latter still forcing the domestic
enterprise to lose goodwill development and result in net social costs to the domestic
country).
7. Khoury, supra note 1, at 22.
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2) The ability to create new trademarks in any country is
inherently correlated to the economic and commercial structure
of that country. Thus, the Trademark Potential of a country is
directly affected by the composition and structure of the
country’s economy.8 The Trademark Potential concept provides
an analytical tool that would help predict future trademark use in
developing countries.
3) Where a country has an inherent Trademark Deficit, because
of the structure of its industry, no trademark law (no matter how
CTR-compliant) can effectively boost its Trademark Potential
and ultimately improve its national industry's ability to enter the
market under its own brands.
4) While developed countries enjoy a robust manufactureoriented economy with a trademark surplus and a high
Trademark Potential, developing economies are extractive
economies, with exports dominated by raw materials such as oil.9
Thus, due to their economic orientation, the respective
Trademark Potential of developing countries remains negligible.
5) Where national production manifests a very low Trademark
Potential (due to its focus on primitive or raw products), there is
no environment for fostering national brands.
6) Products and services that dominate the economy of
developing countries have a very low Trademark Potential.10
8. In this regard, a given country or region might participate in world trade within any
of three sectors or a combination thereof, namely: primary raw materials, manufactured
products, or intangible services, each of which has a different “trademark potential.” See
LEE E. PRESTON, TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7 (1970) (suggesting such a trisectoral distinction as the basis for analysis of a nation or region’s trade position in the
world economy).
9. In complete contrast to the situation in developing countries, the U.S. economy has
a mighty “trademark balance” and a very high trademark potential. American corporations
own many hundreds of thousands of marks. See JAMES GERBER, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 4 (2007) (contending that “the vast majority of goods and services we
[Americans] consume are made at home. Haircuts, restaurant meals, gardens, healthcare,
education, financial services, utilities and most of our entertainment, to name a few, are
domestic products. In fact, about 87 percent of what we consume is made in the United
States, since imports are equal to about 13 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP).”).
10. See U.N. Trade & Dev. Board of the Conf. on Trade & Dev. [TDBOR], 10th
Special Sess., Geneva, Switz., Mar. 19, 1979, Report on the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the
External Trade of the Least Developed Countries, 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/735, TD/B/AC.29/1
(Feb. 12, 1979) (submitting that in order to achieve economic developments for developing
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Thus, developing countries lack the ability to increase their
respective shares of trademarks regardless of the strong
protection that is afforded to marks by their national laws.
Furthermore, the foreign franchising activity within developing
countries and those countries' virtually non-existent shares in
super-brands and Multi-National Corporations (“MNCs”),
provide additional support for this conclusion.
7) The adoption and application of the CTR in a developing
country with a low Trademark Potential does not reflect a willful
sovereign action, but rather, is motivated by indirect benefits.
Such adoption and application of legal norms constitutes no more
than a dictated trade-off. Indeed, trademark policy in developing
countries appears to be driven by two primary concerns, namely,
the loss of foreign investments and economic sanctions that may
be imposed (within the WTO framework) as a result of
insufficient protection for intellectual property rights.11
Consequently, my previously published research proclaims that
despite the adoption of CTR-compliant laws, developing countries will
continue to experience a Trademark Deficit due to the inherently low
Trademark Potential of their economies. The trademark régime that has
been adopted into the trademark laws of developing countries has failed to
generate a change within the economic structure of these countries, and its
function has been relegated to protecting brands that are mostly foreignowned and which dominate trademark registration therein. Thus, in the
case of trademark laws, the “law in books” and the “law in action” diverge
rather than converge.12 Indeed, while similar laws may be enacted in
countries it is necessary to expand export earnings and to reduce import costs).
11. Amir H. Khoury, Trademark Policy:
The Case of Arab Countries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 299, 330 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007) (discussing Arab
countries’ compliance with international trademark norms as being driven by the risks of
losing foreign investment and economic sanctions for inadequate intellectual property
protections).
12. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 17 (1910).
Accord Assaf Likhovski, Czernowitz, Lincoln, Jerusalem, and the Comparative History of
American Jurisprudence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 621, 625 n.9 (2003) (“This
distinction was just one element in a new conception of law that emerged in the last decade
of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth century in opposition to what is
sometimes called ‘formalist’ or ‘classical’ legal thought. The new conception included
rejection of the idea of law as a gapless geometric-like system in which specific rules can be
abstractly deduced from general propositions; the notion of the legal order as embedded in
society and emanating from ‘the people’ rather than from an all-powerful state headed by a
sovereign (anti-positivism); a conviction that because law is a reflection of society, the
academic study of law must be informed by the social sciences; an interest in non-state
normative systems (legal pluralism); and, finally, an interest in the use of the law to mitigate
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various countries, their impact on those countries is not homogeneous. The
CTR can affect different countries in different ways. While developed
countries can utilize the CTR to expand their dominance over the brand
market, developing countries, due to their inherently low Trademark
Potential, do not reap any defined equal benefits. In this regard, one
research study has concluded that similar intellectual property laws do not
ensure similar results in different countries: “[E]mpirical claims that IPRs
can generate more international economic activity and greater indigenous
innovation are conditional. Other things being equal, such claims may be
valid--but other things are not equal. Rather, the positive impacts of IPRs
seem stronger in countries with complementary endowments and
policies.”13 Furthermore, it should be noted that indirect benefits such as
foreign direct investments and participation in the WTO framework that
accrue to developing countries, cannot offset the aforementioned
deficiencies of the CTR and its chilling effect vis-à-vis facilitating the entry
of newcomers into the brand market. That is primarily because these
indirect benefits are received by all countries that comply with WTO
standards, notwithstanding their Trademark Potential. In other words,
those indirect benefits are not directed solely to developing countries as a
payoff for their compromise in the intellectual property sector. In this
regard, the legal history of the WTO and of the drafting of the TRIPS
Agreement unequivocally demonstrates that developing countries have not
been real partners in the formulation of the WTO framework.14
1.2 Objectives of the Research
In light of all of these findings, my belief is that change is needed. To
my mind, this change should be about recalibrating the CTR vis-à-vis the
needs of current and prospective brand-owners originating in developing
countries. This would pave the way for the entry of “newcomers” into the
branding scene. Thus, this research is intended to address a single basic
the flaws of liberal individualism.”).
13. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 199
(Institute for International Economics 2000). See also Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust
of Intellectual Property Rights 5 (MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 02-04), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578563 (“While developed countries
might have resources and regulatory mechanisms to reduce the impact of an unbalanced
intellectual property system, such a system would substantially hurt less developed
countries. Many of these countries do not have the wealth, infrastructure, and technological
base to take advantage of the opportunities created by the system. Many of these countries
also lack the national economic strengths and established legal mechanisms to overcome
problems created by an unbalanced system.”).
14. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS (2d ed., Thompson Sweet & Maxwell 2003) (1998) (describing the drafting
process for the TRIPS agreement).
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question: How should the CTR be modified or altered so as to offset the
Trademark Deficit of developing countries and create fertile ground for
fostering new brands originating in those countries?
In this regard, the present research constitutes the culmination of my
earlier work because it transcends the diagnostic role and ventures into the
realm of offering workable solutions. The purpose of this research, then, is
to examine how trademark laws need to be reformulated so as to encourage
newcomers and to create a level playing field. In practical terms, my aim is
to propose a new or modified regulatory environment in the form of a
NeoConventional Trademark Régime that might help developing countries
to penetrate the seemingly impregnable wall that separates the “haves”
from the “have-nots” in the trademarking (branding) arena.
My proposed modifications can be classified into two distinct
categories. The first category includes those modifications that completely
deviate from the Conventional Trademark Régime. The second category,
which I favor, includes a bouquet of conforming yet pragmatic
modifications that function within the CTR. Those modifications would
provide the impetus for a NCTR. The comparison between those two
categories is ultimately settled through a “cost-benefit” prism. However,
before embarking on the task of introducing a NCTR, there is a need to
characterize the CTR and to understand its inner workings.
SECTION TWO: HALLMARKS OF THE CONVENTIONAL TRADEMARK
RÉGIME
Trademarks have long transcended their basic role of denoting the
source of products and have been transformed into an economic asset in
their own right. Indeed, while the function of trademarks was originally
limited to guaranteeing origin and ensuring the quality of products bearing
the mark, over the years the trademark has mutated into a tool for
advertising and marketing.15 Presently, leading and famous marks have
acquired an independent commercial status that is distinct from the
respective goods/services that they cover.16 They have become pivotal
15. See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 157, 168, 204-205
(Dartmouth Publishing 1996) (discussing the history of the philosophy of intellectual
property); ALISON FIRTH, TRADE MARKS THE NEW LAW 9-11 (Jordan Publishing Ltd. 1995)
(describing the development of trademarks); Ida M. Azmi et al, Distinctive Signs and Early
Markets: Europe, Africa and Islam, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123
(Alison Firth ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997) (describing trademark development in specific
cultures); Patricia K. Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of
a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297 (1998) (examining modern trademark use).
16. FIRTH, supra note 15, at 12; Liz Cratchley, The Brand Owner’s View, in 7
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11 (Norma Dawson & Alison Firth eds., Sweet
& Maxwell 2000); see also Amir H. Khoury, Well-Known and Famous Trademarks in
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commercial assets and in some cases even cultural icons.17 Expanding
international trade and the ever-increasing use of trademarks (and service
marks) have acted as catalysts for enhancing the international protection for
these marks.18
2.1 Trademarks between Local Law and International Standards
Trademarks, much like other types of intellectual property rights, have
received protection within a wide array of international, regional, and
national agreements and laws. The 1883 Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property was the first multilateral agreement
intended to protect trademarks, as well as other forms of industrial property
subject matter. Since then, other treaties have been introduced, culminating
in the Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”).19 TRIPS requires member-states to establish a minimum level of
intellectual property protection in their national law. With respect to
trademarks, TRIPS sets various standards, including: the recognition of service
marks; setting a minimum (renewable) term of protection; defining use
requirements; and enhancing the role of customs in enforcement and
recognizing well-known marks even if not registered in the specific
jurisdiction.20 In addition, TRIPS allows for canceling the registration of a
mark due to non-use (subject to exceptions). TRIPS also confirms the right
to use a mark without conditions, and regulates issues of licensing and
assignment. TRIPS specifies minimum standards of protection that are to
be adopted by the national laws of all members of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”).21 TRIPS has raised the minimum level of
Israel: TRIPS From Manhattan to the Dawn of a New Millennium!, 12(4) FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 991, 991 (2002) (discussing more on the regulative
structure of well-known marks); Helen Norman, Schecter’s “The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection” Revisited, in 7 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 191
(Norma Dawson & Alison Firth eds., Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) (exploring the use of
trademarks as valuable marketing assets).
17. Jonathan E. Schroeder, Brand Culture: Trade Marks, Marketing and Consumption,
in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 161, 161-176 (Jane
Ginsburg, Lionel Bently & Jennifer Davis eds., Cambridge University Press 2008).
18. Indeed, world trade in both goods and services has been growing. In 1998, global
trade in goods amounted to a staggering US$6.5 trillion dollars, and reportedly created 1.5
million new jobs. Likewise, trade in service has expanded, and in 1996 it amounted to
US$1.2 trillion. See BEVERLY M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 15 (Transnational Publishers 1998) (discussing the expansion of world trade).
19. See Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of Intellectual Property Law, 2 MARQ. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (describing the evolution of international trademark agreements); see also
GERVAIS, supra note 14 (describing the creation of the TRIPS agreement).
20. MASKUS, supra note 13, at 26. See also Khoury, supra note 16, at 999 (discussing
standards established by TRIPS on IPRs).
21. See JOHN JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
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protection in accordance with the standards set by developed countries. It
has revolutionized intellectual property protection because of its
substantive rules, its effective harmonization of national intellectual
property laws, and its ability to ensure the adoption and continued
enforcement of these norms. In all, the TRIPS Agreement constitutes the
backbone of the CTR. However, given the circumstances under which
TRIPS had been formulated, it is possible to conclude that CTR has not
been shaped in accordance with national interests, but rather is intertwined
in the wider context of international trade.22 In other words, adopting
modern standards of intellectual property protection is not simply a matter
of choice, but rather, a matter of political and commercial necessity.
According to research, this outcome can best be explained by
understanding the distinct narratives relating to the creation of the TRIPS
agreement, namely “bargain,” “coercion,” “ignorance,” and “selfinterest.”23
RELATIONS 289-326 (3d ed., West Publishing Co. 1995) (noting that the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations lasted from 1986-1994 and resulted in a better-defined international
organization). The WTO stems from the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which was
concluded in December of 1993. Id. These were signed by 100 states in April 1994. Id.
Since that date, the number of WTO members has risen to 153. Id. See also WTO,
Members and Observer, http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
(last visited July 23, 2008) (providing more information on WTO membership). It is worth
noting that the WTO does not provide any definitions of what constitutes a “developed” or
“developing” country. Id. Developing countries in the WTO are classified as such based on
“self election.” Id. PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(Kluwer Law International 2000). Gallagher provides a list of the WTO members and
indicates the countries that are “Least Developed.” Id. Gallagher also explains that this
category of “Least Developed Countries” (“LDC”) is based on a United Nations
Classification, whereby 48 countries are included in that category (30 of which are WTO
members). Id. The WTO came into effect on January 1, 1995 and is regarded as the more
sophisticated successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Id. The
WTO is perceived as a mechanism for facilitating and unifying international trade. Id. The
WTO performs the following functions: (1) Administration and implementation of the
multilateral trade agreements that makeup the WTO; including those dealing with IP issues;
(2) Providing a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; (3) Providing assistance to the
resolution of international trade disputes; (4) Oversight of international trade policies; and
(5) Cooperation with other international institutions involved in global economic policy
making. Id. See generally Waincymer J., Settlement of Disputes Within the World Trade
Organization: A Guide to the Jurisprudence, 24 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1247 (2001)
(discussing the aims and organs of dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization).
22. See JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 21, at 291, 885-92 (describing the process by
which the TRIPS agreement was drafted, including multiple international compromises).
23. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 369
(2006). Yu contends that each of these narratives provides valuable insight into
understanding the context in which the Agreement was created. Id. The article then
explores why less-developed countries have been dissatisfied with the international
intellectual property system and discusses the latest developments in the area, such as the
recent WTO debacle in Cancun, the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements, and the increasing use of technological protection measures. Id. The article
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The TRIPS agreement has now been equated with combating other
impediments to trade, such as dumping and GATT-regulated subsidies.24
This has been achieved by incorporating TRIPS within the World Trade
Organization scheme and by subjecting related disputes to the WTO's
dispute resolution mechanisms.25 In this regard, TRIPS varies greatly from
past intellectual property agreements in that it provides “teeth” that help
ensure its effective implementation and enforcement.26 In effect, countries
are now subjected to a host of pressures, and as such have adopted the CTR
concludes by offering suggestions on how less-developed countries can reform the
international intellectual property system. Id. Instead of calling for a complete overhaul or
the abandonment of the TRIPS Agreement, the article takes the position that the Agreement
is here to stay and explores, from that standpoint, how less-developed countries can take
advantage of the Agreement and reform the international intellectual property system. Id.
24. The Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round stated that, “[i]n order to reduce
the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines.” WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on
the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 September 1986), Part I Negotiations on Trade in
Goods,
available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.ministerial.declaration.uruguay.round.1986/d.html. See
generally ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 121 (stating that TRIPS does not obviate the need for
a national system of intellectual property protection for non-industrial countries);
CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE NEW ENCLOSURES? 78 (2000) (“To assert the trade-relatedness of intellectual property is
to make a claim for it to be legitimately included within the legal structure governing world
trade.”); ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
67-92 (1990) (surveying available literature related to the impact of intellectual property
protection on innovation, research, development, technology, and economic growth).
25. See MAY, supra note 24, at 74 (noting that TRIPS “disputes are mediated at the
WTO through the agency of inter-governmental diplomacy.”); DAVID W. PLANT,
RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (1999) (discussing the
resolution of disputes arising from intellectual property in the international context). See
generally GALLAGHER, supra note 21, at 182 (“Members are permitted to limit the scope of
rights within certain bounds, including to grant compulsory licenses under certain
conditions, and to take measures to prevent abusive anti-competitive practices.”). WTO
members that do not comply with these trademark standards may be subjected to economic
and trade sanctions imposed by other WTO member states or to expulsion from that
organization. Id. TRIPS allow for settling disputes between member states over IP issues
by applying the WTO “Dispute Settlement Mechanism.” Id. This mechanism also covers
disputes pertaining to “National Treatment” as well as issues of “Most Favored Nation”
status. Id. Other issues such as Gray Market (parallel imports) have been left out of TRIPS
and the “Dispute Settlement Mechanism.” Id.
26. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 475 (1997). See also, International Trademark
Association, TRIPS 2000 Subcommittee Treaty Analysis Committee, Developing Countries
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement (Updated Version) (Oct. 1999),
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_trips2000.pdf (discussing how TRIPS provides rules
concerning trade-related intellectual property rights).
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without questioning the scope of its benefits and possible pitfalls. Drahos
concludes that developing countries have comparably little influence in the
international intellectual property standard setting process.27 The diversion
of intellectual property issues in the GATT-WTO forum and consequent
creation of TRIPS was a product of forum shifting.28 In view of the current
structure of international trade, developing countries appear to have
resigned themselves to the fact that they have no real choice but to join the
WTO because, in the long-run, no country can survive economically
outside the WTO.29 In addition to the multilateral track, unilateral
pressures have been brought to bear on developing countries. The most
prevalent of these is Special 301 of the US Trade Act which authorizes the
United States Trade Representative to determine the adequacy and
effectiveness of intellectual property rights in other countries.30
2.2 The Impact of the Conventional Trademark Régime
Given the low Trademark Potential of developing countries, this
system, perhaps inadvertently, helps preserve the unrivaled exposure and
27. PETER DRAHOS, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARD-SETTING,
www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp8_drahos_study.pdf, at 2 (“The main
reason lies in the continued use of webs of coercion by the US and EU, both of which
remain united on the need for strong global standards of intellectual property protection.”).
28. Id.
29. See ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 4 (outlining Dependency theory as an explanation
for relations between developing and developed countries); K. C. Fung et al., Developing
Countries and the World Trade Organization: A Foreign Influence Approach 26 (J. Int’l
Trade & Econ. Dev., BBVA Working Paper No. 0912, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468111 (“[P]owerful countr[ies] will always have an incentive to
exert pressure on the poor . . . , but the developing countries will be better off with the WTO
since its nondiscrimination principles help to mitigate and temper some of these
influences.”); Ehsan Masood, Why the Poorest Countries Need a WTO, OPEN DEMOCRACY,
Dec.
13,
2005,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationtrade_economy_justice/wto_3116.jsp (arguing that “a determined poor country stands a
better chance of getting its way in the WTO than it does through other UN agreements”).
30. Trade Act of 1974, 301-06 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. 2411-16), amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, 93 Stat. 295 (1979), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-573, 304-306,
98 Stat. 3002 (1984), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1301—02 (1988). See Judith H.
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementations, and
Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 260-61 (1989-90) (discussing Special 301's aim to
promote the adequate and effective prosecution of intellectual property rights in foreign
countries); Kevin M. McDonald, The Unilateral Undermining of Conventional International
Trade Law via Section 301, 7 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 395, 408-10 (1998) (arguing that
Special 301 violates international law as established under the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism). See generally ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 7 (finding that the US has, through
TRIPS, imposed its economic interests on various countries and regions including
developing countries, and has subjected non-compliant countries to unilateral measures by
the U.S., forcing the hand of developing countries).
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distribution of marks originating in developed countries. CTR is a
problematic system because it does nothing to help developing economies
compete in the global marketplace. CTR thus contributes to preserving the
already vast economic rift between “North” and “South.” According to
Dependency theorists, this enhances the argument against the blind
importation of “Western” laws that are held to be “universal.”31 Dealing
with the issue of trademarks in a sterile manner while overlooking the
economic reality of the countries involved will only provide conclusions
based on half-truths. This view, regarding the effects of the law on
different market players, is not limited to trademarks; it has preoccupied
research in other fields of intellectual property, particularly patents. For
example, one study has demonstrated that the terms under which
downstream firms can access intellectual property affects entry decisions,
product diversity, prices, and welfare.32 The concept of harmonization in
trademarks, as in other fields, cannot ensure fair global redistribution of
resources. Research dealing with international taxation has demonstrated
that the concept of harmonization, even when it exists, is not synonymous
with a “just” redistribution on a global scale.33 Consequently, the
31. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 8-9. See generally Leaffer, supra note 19, at 3-4
(“[T]rademark law has undergone profound changes, both multilaterally and regionally
[examples being the Madrid Protocol, the Trademark Law Treaty and the Community
Trademark]. These changes, brought about by increasing globalization of markets, are
leading toward the acceptance of universal trademark norms and . . . we may even see the
eventual unification of trademark law among nations.”); ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE,
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 21 (1978) (noting that “laws should as closely as possible express
standards of conduct necessary for resolving current and foreseeable problems in society.
The inference is that a proper identification of the real and possible problems within non-ICs
must be the basis for introduction of relevant laws and mechanisms to help resolve those
problems”).
32. Patrick Rey & David Salant, Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual
Property, (June 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302368.
33. Tsilly Dagan, Just Harmonization (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.law.ubc.ca/files/pdf/ncbl/papers/Dagan.pdf. This skeptic approach
to the perceived benefits of harmonized systems such as that of the WTO has emerged in
other contexts. Id. Dagan has demonstrated that in the context of international taxation
“[h]armonization in itself is not necessarily a solution for a just global redistribution of
wealth.” Id. at 43. Furthermore Dagan has alluded to the fact that “[a]lthough negotiations
might be perceived as serving the interests of all the parties involved, they can, in fact, result
in troubling outcomes. Id. at 28. Negotiations seem like a neutral procedure, since
countries are free to choose whether or not to participate. Id. But in actuality, the shift from
competition to negotiations is not a trivial move; replacing tax competition with negotiations
entails costs for some of the parties and benefits for others.” Id. As such, Dagan is not
optimistic about the redistributive attributes of harmonization. Id. She argues that, “[u]nder
this scenario, harmonization would protect residence countries from tax competition among
themselves but would drive taxation in host countries to the bottom, in preventing them
from collecting taxes from foreign investors. Id. at 21. Thus, developed countries can be
best understood here as operating as a cartel of capital suppliers—and transferring the costs
of harmonization to developing countries.” Id.
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perplexing ease with which non-industrialized countries adopt the “latest”
intellectual property laws and standards has been harshly criticized as “out
of touch with the existing problems in the countries concerned.”34 As noted
above, the only explanation for the adoption of the CTR by developing
countries is the pressure that has been brought to bear on them by
developed countries.
SECTION THREE: EXTREME REACTIONS TO THE MODERN TRADEMARK
RÉGIME
Conceptually speaking, trademarks are not a limited public good.
There are an infinite number of possible distinctive trademarks.35 As such,
on its face, it should not matter under what trademark a given market
player operates because his competitors are entitled to operate under any
other marks that they respectively devise. Furthermore, trademark
ownership is just a commercially-oriented proxy mechanism for (foreign or
local) ownership of goods and services traded in a given country.
Therefore, it should not matter whether ownership of the mark is local or
foreign. In addition, trademark laws afford equal protection to marks
without regard to their proprietors’ origin, i.e., domestic or foreign. This
concept of equality is embedded in the CTR and is articulated by two
principles, namely National Treatment (“NT”) and Most Favored Nation
(“MFN”).36 When combined, these two principles ensure that memberstates treat domestic and foreign entities in the same manner. In the
context of trademark regulation, it means that local or foreign mark owners
can qualify for equal trademark protection as afforded by national law.
However, this legal equality and freedom to select marks should not, and
cannot, function as a curtain which conceals the commercial realities on the
ground. As demonstrated by my earlier research, this prima facie equality
on the legal-administrative level does not necessarily entail equality on the
commercial-substantive level. The findings in my previous research
indicate that despite the equality on the formal level, brands emanating

34. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 7.
35. With the exception of shapes and colors. See Ann Bartow, The True Colors of
Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti Competition Blues 97 KY. L.J. 263
(2008) (arguing that the ability to trademark colors inhibits legitimate competition); Amir H.
Khoury, Three Dimensional Objects as Marks: Does a Dark Shadow Loom Over
Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 335 (2008) (demonstrating that three
dimensional objects can operate simultaneously as both a trademark and an industrial
design).
36. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art.
3, Jan. 1, 1995 (“Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no
less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property.”).
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from developing countries have no real presence on the international
trademark scene and do not even have an equal footing in their own
markets. Apart from the low Trademark Potential of developing countries,
various foreign super-brands command a much higher value and impact on
commercial activity.37 Therefore, despite the equal legal footing afforded
to all market players, those from developing countries are at a disadvantage
due to the low Trademark Potential of their domestic industry and the
market strength that their brands enjoy.
In the preceding section, I have established that the mere imitation of
formalistic trademark protection legal structures that has been erected by
developed countries does not necessarily improve the Trademark Balance
of developing countries (given their low Trademark Potential). On the
contrary, it appears that these laws only serve to encourage the entry of
additional foreign brands into the markets of developing countries. This, in
turn, would reduce the chances of market entry by newcomers. It would
also contribute to preserving the status of developing countries as merely
import markets and allow foreign brands uncontested hegemony over local
markets. This would not only manifest itself on the fiscal commercial level
but would also impact local culture. Here, foreign marks have been
infiltrating local culture and affecting moral values in society.38
In light of these realities and adverse effects on newcomer states, and
given their low Trademark Potential, it is quite possible to envision cases
in which those states would search for specific solutions intended to
neutralize the adverse effects on their status as competitors in the branding
market. This section is intended to examine possible far reaching and
extreme solutions that are expected to entail unjustified costs.
3.1 Maintaining the Status-quo
The first possible reaction to this situation might be to maintain the
status quo by reasoning that the CTR is part of a more expansive “tradeoff” which developing countries have accepted in order to enhance their

37. See generally Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, The Role of Trademarks in
Developing Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN, New
York, 1979, at 13 [hereinafter UNCTAD] (“[W]hile all registered trade marks have the
same legal value and unlimited life, as long as they are renewed, their commercial value and
duration are widely different.”).
38. See ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 6-7 (“The advocacy for, and support of, borrowing
by non-ICs is done in disregard of considerations that may show certain IP forms as being
more suitable for a certain country or time than for another country or for a different time. . .
. Much of the borrowing or formulation of IP policies and laws in non-ICs has involved . . .
very little or no understanding of the dynamic that operates in the economic and
technological domain of the non-ICs.”).
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ability to engage in international trade and commerce.39 However, given
the conclusions in my previous research, it is highly doubtful that this
reasoning is sufficient to justify CTR status quo. Given the inherently low
Trademark Potential of countries, one cannot simply adopt the CTR and
then hope for the best. Proactive action needs to be taken in order to align
the CTR with the needs and interests of developing countries.
My view rests on the premise that trademarks do not constitute an end
in themselves, but rather a means towards regulating commerce. As such,
the validity of a given trademark system always needs to be contingent on
its commercial benefits. Indeed, in view of the Trademark Potential
concept, the impact of the CTR on any given country depends on that
country’s economy. Therefore, if the CTR is creating a hurdle to market
entry, it needs to be changed.
It is worth noting that the CTR and its main component, i.e., TRIPS,
reflect but one variant of how intellectual property is regulated around the
world. For example, while the European Union (“EU”) model requires
member-states to adhere to a full harmonization of intellectual property
policy, the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) sets higher
standards than those prescribed by TRIPS and without requiring
harmonization.40 Mercosur,41 as well as bilateral agreements between the
EU and various non-EU members, allow for policy variances.42 An
additional model that is applied by the Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum (“APEC”) is based on mutual exhortation to proceed as
is appropriate to each nation, without formal negotiations on IPRs. This
allows each state to formulate an intellectual property régime that balances
the moral justifications of intellectual property protection and its national
interests.43 Such a model may be useful in circumventing the national

39. See Carlos M. Correa, The Strengthening of IPRs in Developing Countries and
2
(Oct.
2000),
available
at
Complimentary
Legislation,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/AboutDFID/files/itd/ip
rcl.pdf (stating that developing countries have accepted the CTR despite the fact that it often
places them in an unfavorable position).
40. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 5 (comparing EU model and NAFTA model
requirements for member states).
41. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercosur (defining the Mercosur as a
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay created
in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción and later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of
Ouro Preto with the purpose to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people,
and currency). See also Edgardo Rotman, A Guide to Mercosur Legal Research: Sources
and Documents, GLOBALEX (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Mercosur.htm
(discussing the “Mercosur,” a Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay to
set up a common market and eliminate trade barriers).
42. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that some agreements merely provide
base requirements which states may then exceed).
43. Id.
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treatment principle, especially where a country’s economic interests dictate
this. What is more, research has identified various trends that have been
intended to allow countries to circumvent “intellectual property
harmonization” in order to “reclaim autonomy over their intellectual
property policies.”44
3.2 Radical Interventions
Given the misgivings of the CTR, there is a need to consider options
for change. One option for altering the CTR involves radical steps that
diverge from the existing régime.
3.2.1 Abolishing the Conventional Trademark Régime
The low Trademark Potential and the Trademark Deficit of
developing countries constitute a microcosm of the underdevelopment of
these “periphery” countries. Therefore, when considering how to react to
the CTR, it is helpful to consider existing models for combating
underdevelopment in non-industrialized countries.45
In this regard
dependency theorists entertain the idea of “detaching,” “delinking,” or
“decoupling” the economies of non-industrialized countries from those of
industrialized countries.46 In the context of trademarks, this most radical
approach of delinking calls for abolishing trademarks altogether because
brands are merely an embodiment of capitalism in the age of globalization.
In this regard the claim would be that if the CTR cannot remedy the
Trademark Deficit because of the inherently low Trademark Potential of
developing countries, then there is no sense in applying the CTR in those

44. Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 73 (2007). Yu identifies five disharmonizing trends that offer
resistance to the recent push for greater harmonization in the international intellectual
property arena: (1) the inclusion of reciprocity provisions in national laws; (2) the demands
for diversification; (3) the use of bilateral and plurilateral agreements; (4) the creation of
non-national systems as a response to Internet disputes; and (5) the reliance on alternative
measures by rights holders. Id.
45. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 4. In this context, the dependency theory has
entertained a variety of models that may be applicable when considering underdevelopment
in non-industrial countries, including socialism. Id. The rationale for such a far-reaching
approach is, according to one commentator, that “dependent bourgeoisie . . . has been
unable to undertake national development and may in fact impede it.” Id. Hence, there is a
necessity to bring economic control back into the hands of the masses. Id.
46. See id. at 8 (suggesting that non-ICs should “reject international IP rights and enter
into bilateral arrangements if they need to. . . . [And n]on-ICs which have already
introduced IP [laws] modeled after those in ICs and have become members of international
conventions will have to rethink their actions and withdraw from them.”).
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countries.
One variant of this approach, namely the “No Logo” approach,
submits that brands have overrun our lives because we live in a world in
which everything has been branded, including taste, cultural standards, and
even values.47 According to this approach brands have lost their
justification because they have done away with their original function of
indicating origin and assuring the quality of the product and have become
the object of sale. According to that position, successful brands know no
limits; brands have not only moved from denoting a product to denoting a
lifestyle, their owners have now set their sights on seducing the consumer
into believing that he or she can live life inside their respective brand.48 In
effect, trademarks, in their purely indicative capacity, have become a thing
of the past. Trademarks have shed their original skin and become a tool for
market dominance and social change. But the adverse effects of brands do
not end in the commercial sphere. They extend into the cultural sphere as
well. In fact, research indicates that the CTR has been exploited in order to
leverage certain cultural views.49 Foreign brands do not only harness
market control in the commercial sense but they also act as a Trojan horse
whose purpose is to inject new cultural values into a given society. In
effect, some brands that are protected by the CTR embody a whole set of
Western and mostly American values, which might not fit other cultures.50
47. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES xviii (2000)
(suggesting that university students, as well as social and environmental activists are upset
by what they feel is an overarching corporate presence).
48. As such, producers now focus on their brands’ deep inner meanings. Id. at 197.
Namely, how the brand “capture[s] the spirit of individuality, athleticism, wilderness or
community.” Id. Klein focuses on the NIKE mega brand. Id. at 21-22. She contends that,
Nike’s swoosh logo has come to represent the ultimate in athletic style and whose slogan
“just do it” identified it with the assertion of individuality. Id. She perceives brand builders
to be the “new primary producers in our so-called knowledge economy.” Id. at 198. It is
they who formulate what is of “true value: the idea, the life style, the attitude.” Id. at 198.
See also Walden Bello, No Logo: A Brilliant but Flawed Portrait of Contemporary
Capitalism – A review of No Logo by Naomi Klein, Sept. 30, 2001,
http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalism/nologo.htm (reviewing Klein’s work).
49. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534-35
(1987) (holding that the word “Olympic” is trademarked and cannot be used to describe an
amateur athletic competition). See generally ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 226, 226-29 (1998)
(explaining that those who own trademarks can influence cultural norms); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying
and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 279-81 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis eds.,
2007) (arguing that trademark holders have been able to control certain aspects of our lives).
50. See Teresa Da Silva Lopes & Mark Christopher Casson, Entrepreneurship and the
Development of Global Brands 81 BUS. HIST. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (arguing that some of
the most successful companies have done cross-country analysis before marketing their
brand); Smita Sharma, Onslaught of Global Brands - Indian Brands Fight Back!! 1 (2005),
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Generally, these brands also carry a collective message, which is one of
consumerism, a distinctively Western “value.” In fact, due to this
interrelation between brands and culture, some have referred to
globalization as “Americanization,” “McDonaldization,” or “Cocalization”
of the world.51 Furthermore, the mere fact that many of the leading brands
are now owned by multinational corporations or holding companies that are
registered in offshore locations, does not change the fact that those brands
remain foreign and still dominate the local markets of many developing
countries.52 In this context it is still possible to identify a core institution
for each brand despite the multinational nature of the brand owning entity
and the reliance on “outsourcing” models of production.53
Consequently, in view of the iron grip with which leading brands
dominate the markets, and in view of the fact that such brands have
transcended their original function of indicating origin, it is not surprising
that the idea of abolishing trademarks has appeared as a plausible solution.
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704266 (suggesting that Indian brands can survive in
India despite competition with global brands if they offer something the global brands do
not); John Tomlinson, Cultural Globalization: Placing and Displacing the West, 8 EUR. J.
DEV. 22-36 (1996) (examining cultural globalization as an extension of Western cultural
power).
51. See Al-Tom, Abed-Allah Othman & Adam, Abed Al-Ra-oof Mohammad,
Globalization: An Analytical and Critical Study 98, 103 (Dar Alwarrak, London 1999)
(noting that globalization and Western brand proliferation appears to fit logically within the
perceived Western economic domination, noting Gandhi’s philosophy that opposed
consumption of foreign products, contending that consumption contributed to continued
British control of India, and, in addition, referring to a statement by Lord Cromer (the
British High Commissioner of Egypt during 1883-1907) who boasted of his success (within
only 15 years) in turning Egyptian textile workshops in Cairo into coffee shops—this after
hampering the competitiveness of the Egyptian textile industry (which had been in stiff
competition with the Lancashire textile companies of England)). Clearly, proponents of
globalization reject the notion that globalization is an extension of imperialism. Id.
According to those while imperialism achieved control by force, globalization does not. Id.
Accordingly, globalization is essentially a pacifist approach that does not employ the
methods of “cultural imperialism.” Id. That approach also contends that the “cultural
dimension” emanating from consumer brands is in fact a perception created by the
consumers (in other non-Western cultures) and is not forced on those consumers by the
“Western” brand owners and producers. Producers (in the West) are not preoccupied with
“creating” new cultures but rather with increasing sales. Id. As such, globalization today
should not be identified with Western imperialism, since some aspects of globalization
(such as inventions and the environment) are in the interest of all countries and peoples. Id.
See, e.g., Tomlinson supra note 50, at 22-36 (1996) (concluding that globalization may not
be completely within the grip of the West).
52. See Ricardo G. Flores &, Ruth V. Aguilera, Globalization and Location Choice:
An Analysis of US Multinational Firms in 1980 and 2000, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1187,
1189 (2007) (discussing the dominance of foreign brands).
53. See Kenneth M. Amaeshi, Onyeka K. Osuji & Paul Nnodim, Corporate Social
Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A Boundaryless Responsibility?
Clarifications, Exceptions and Implications 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 223, 224-25 (2008)
(providing details on the structure of the brand ownership and production chains).
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It is worth mentioning that the concept of abolishing the use of trademarks
is not new. Indeed, the idea was raised in the early 1970s, in the context of
pharmaceutical products with the aim of reducing the price of drugs.54 This
approach of “de-linking” in the context of trademarks would involve taking
radical steps including the refusal to register foreign marks. It would also
include severely restricting their registration, refusing to base local
applications on foreign registrations, cancelling procedures for priority
applications, and nullifying (or limiting) all legal defenses or rights based
on foreign marks, as well as well-known foreign marks. I submit that such
a radical approach should be rejected because it entails many losses that
render it morally, legally, socially, and economically unjustified. But most
importantly, the lack of protection for this intellectual property subject
matter is likely to discourage foreign investments that fuel economic
development, create new jobs (domestically), and attract technology.55
Indeed, the cost analysis of the “de-linking” approach will entail adverse
consequences. First and foremost, by abolishing trademarks the regulatory
system would undermine the moral justification for rewarding efforts that
are directed towards creating the goodwill (reputation) for brands. This
would further diminish the benefits of trademarks, namely, indicating

54. See Robert Niblack, TRADEMARKS WHY? 5-8 (1976) (“Benefits to be gained by
generic prescribing in contrast to prescribing by trademarks have been grossly overstated.”).
Niblack defines a generic name of a product as the common non-proprietary descriptive
name of a chemical or other entity and can be used by anyone. Id. at 9. In the case of a
pharmaceutical product, it refers to an active ingredient in that product and is a shorthand
version (adopted by a committee on names) of the chemical name which defines the
complete molecular structure of that active ingredient. Id. Niblack reasons: (1) that
trademarks are a useful tool for identifying the source or origin of goods, and as such, both
producer and consumer benefit from their use; (2) commonly, it is more practical to
introduce a pharmaceutical product under a trademark than under its chemical or generic
name; (3) as an indication of quality, a trademark prompts the producer to maintain the
quality of his product, and if one trademark falls below the producers' usual standards
(quality, value, and service), it may bring down with it his entire reputation and goodwill;
therefore, the producer will typically not introduce his trademarked pharmaceutical product
before sufficient medical research is conducted; (4) trademarks do not increase the price of
pharmaceutical products, and hence, using a chemical or generic name rather than
trademarks is not justified; (5) a product sold under the generic name “merely identifies its
active ingredient(s) and gives no indication whatsoever of other features of the product, for
example quality, formulation, dosage forms, biovalidity or, of course, source;” and (6) the
price of a medicine is determined by constant costs, regardless of whether it is a generic or
trademarked product. Id. According to Niblack these constant costs include the innovation
level of the product; the product’s cost of development, production and introduction costs,
the market structure or competing products, capacity, number, nature and price of
competitive products, etc.; and the general conduct of the manufacturing firm (costs and
sophistication or research programs, overhead expenses, anticipated earnings, etc.) Id.
55. See Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in 2
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 70-73 (Adrian Sterling ed., 1997)
(discussing the economical benefits of trademarks).
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origin and preventing forgery. Furthermore, the complete delinking from
TRIPS by developing countries would effectively undermine the entire
structure of that agreement. Consequently, any country that embarks on
this road should also expect to lose its membership in the WTO without
which the prospects for foreign trade would be greatly reduced.56 Such
“rogue states” should expect to incur severe trade losses, and to see a
reduction in the scope of their exports.57 Furthermore, in the absence of a
trademark régime, additional costs are anticipated. They are highlighted at
the end of this section.
3.2.2 Restricting Entry of Dominant Foreign Brands
Another radical step that might be undertaken by developing countries
in response to the CTR would be to bar or limit the entry of certain foreign
brands that dominate commercial activity in their respective fields. In such
a case, the argument would be that some foreign brands have attained such
a degree of renown and influence to the extent that local industry is unable
to compete against them. Supporters of this approach might contend that
the concept of prohibiting the entry of foreign products has already been
utilized by the United States through Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, which allows a U.S. petitioner to bar the entry into the
U.S. of foreign products that infringe a U.S. patent or any other patent
right.58 The rationale behind Section 337 is that countries are entitled to
invoke measures in order to limit the entry of certain infringing brands. As
such, Section 337 is considered to fall within the powers granted to
member-states, by TRIPS, to exercise border measures that enhance the
enforcement of intellectual property rights and place restrictions on
infringing products entering the country.59 By similar measure, it might be
possible to tolerate certain protectionist steps that are intended to curb
foreign trademark dominance. Facially, the analogy seems to be out of
place because, while Section 337 is intended to protect marks, my proposed
56. Indeed, even vast economies such as China have been keen to join the WTO.
57. One interesting, albeit theoretical, scenario is that of a synchronized mass delinking by all underdeveloped countries. Such a “collective” walkout by the “consuming”
countries may yield a reopening for negotiations of the entire world trade structure.
58. David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 107 (1995) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)
(1988)). In view of this harsh remedy, it is not surprising “that most Section 337 actions are
settled either through the issuance by the U.S. International Trade Commission of a ‘cease
and desist’ order or through a settlement that contemplates the conclusion of a royaltypayment licensing agreement between the U.S. patent holder and the foreign producer who
is allegedly infringing the [IPR].” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (1988); 19 C.F.R.
§210.51(b)-(c) (1994)).
59. Gantz, supra note 58, at 108 (referring to the provision of the TRIPS agreement that
pertains to special requirements relating to border measures).
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measures appear to do the opposite. However, once these protectionist
measures are considered from a different perspective, the analogy appears
to make more sense. Indeed, in both cases the State intervenes in order to
protect its national commercial interests. That is to say, the State perceives
itself as a relevant actor vis-à-vis commercial activity that has adverse
spillover effects on its national market.
However, even if the analogy does hold water, I predict that it will not
be sustainable primarily because it undermines the legal equality between
brand owners, without which, international trademark protection would be
nullified. In addition, it creates a spiral-down effect which can effectively
lead to the abolishment of all forms of multilateral trademark regulation
and a return to pure “nationalistic” regulation which does not fit into the
reality of global trade.60 Such a trend would most likely lead to a slippery
slope argument that would pave the way for additional unilateral State
action against the entire WTO-GATT framework, including the reimposition of duties and tariffs on foreign imports and the granting of
subsidies to national manufacturers.
3.2.3 Raising the Level of the Test of Likelihood of Confusion
Trademark infringements are generally determined using the test of
likelihood of confusion.61 Hence, by raising the bar in this test, local
trademark owners would be able to compete more easily with foreign
marks without being considered as infringing on those marks. In other
words, domestic brand owners would be less at risk of being held liable for
trademark infringement of other marks. For example, local courts might
provide less protection to colors, shapes or certain words by raising the
level of the phonetic or visual similarities that are required in order to make
a determination of trademark infringement.62 However, such a far-reaching
rule is likely to encourage the use of confusingly similar marks rather than
to increase the flexibility within the CTR. That is why such a rule, if

60. Riccardo Faini, Trade Liberalization in a Globalizing World (2004) (Centre for
Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 4665, October 2004) available at
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4665.
61. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761-62
(2004) (explaining that under the “likelihood of confusion” test, infringement will be found
if the marks are deemed sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected).
62. Bartow, supra note 35, at 263. Bartow cautions that “[t]rademark law can be used
to monopolistically harness the aesthetic appeal or preexisting social meaning of a color.”
Id. In her view, the Supreme Court in Qualitex v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,
161 (1995) “was wrong to facilitate this abuse of trademark powers” by ruling “that colors
alone could constitute protectable trademarks.” Id. In her view this ruling “reduced
competition and consumer choice by creating illegitimate aesthetic and communicative
cartels.” Id. at 264.
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adopted, must be implemented with care because it carries a risk whereby
confusion would prevail and consumers would be misled into purchasing
products that they do not desire. Another option, which is less problematic,
might assume the form of a narrower application of specific doctrines, such
as that of the initial interest confusion and post-sale confusion.63
3.2.4 Restricting Franchising
It might be possible to curb the economic impact that is associated
with franchising by imposing various restrictions on franchising activities.64
That is especially needed in view of the fact that franchising activity by
foreigners seems to overlook local particularities.65 In the context of this
research, developing countries might elect to raise the level of supervision
that is required of brand owners. This might cause a rise in the cost of
these transactions and render them altogether less lucrative. In addition,
developing countries may choose to limit the share of profits that
franchisees are entitled to collect. While all of these restrictions can
achieve the goal of discouraging the entry of foreign brand owners into a
developing country, they also constitute a blatant and disproportionate
intervention in the freedom of contract between franchisers and
franchisees. Still this intervention could be upheld due to the unbalanced
bargaining positions of both parties. A more radical step would be to
restrict franchising altogether. This would be applicable to cases in which

63. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 107 (2005). While “[t]he benchmark of
trademark infringement in the United States traditionally has been a demonstration that
consumers are likely to be confused by the use of a similar or identical trademark to identify
the goods or services of another . . . a court-created doctrine called ‘initial interest
confusion’ . . . allow[s] findings of trademark infringement solely on the basis that a
consumer might initially be ‘interested,’ ‘attracted,’ or ‘distracted’ by a competitor's, or
even a non-competitor's, product or service.” Id. at 107-8 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). Initial interest confusion is being used with increasing frequency, especially in the
context of the Internet, and “application of the . . . doctrine prevents comparative
advertisements, limits information available to consumers, and shuts down speech critical of
trademark holders and their products and services.” Id. at 108. See also Ben Allgrove &
Peter O'Byrne, Post-Sale Confusion, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 315, 315 (2007)
(exploring the implications of the initial interest doctrine after the sale of an infringing good
or service under UK law).
64. Rahul Chakraborty, Franchising Laws in India-The Road Ahead 7-9 (Jan. 31, 2009)
(working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335868 (suggesting a well
developed legal structure on franchising is necessary for the effective functioning of
business).
65. See Francine Lafontaine & Joanne E. Oxley, International Franchising Practices in
Mexico: Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts? 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 95,
95 (2004) (exploring and comparing contractual restrictions in franchising agreements in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico).
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foreign franchises are found to severely disrupt market competition due to
the market power associated with the foreign brand involved in the
transaction. In this regard, the rationales of antitrust theory could come
into play.66
3.3 The Ramifications of Radical Intervention
The radical approaches that have been detailed above entail many
costs that render them unwarranted. This subsection details some of the
most prevalent costs that can result from invoking extreme measures, as
described above.
3.3.1 A Surge in Counterfeiting
A weak intellectual property régime is expected to lead to a surge in
counterfeiting. Even now, counterfeiting constitutes a global phenomenon
that is intertwined with globalization.67 Indeed, just as it has become easier
to engage in international trade, it has also become easier to trade in
counterfeit goods.68 Counterfeiting is widespread in many types of
commodities.69 In the absence of a trademark régime, counterfeiting is
expected to increase exponentially. That is because abolishing the CTR
would create a regulatory vacuum in which counterfeiting could thrive. It
is worth noting that this problem, even with the existing CTR, poses a
serious threat to producers around the world.70 Indeed, according to one

66. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1091, 1091 (2002) (noting an unnatural monopoly has been created for trademark
owners by the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy).
67. Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1, 1 (2000); David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The Criminalization of Trademark
Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
68. One commentary observes that “[a]s global trade has become easier, so the global
trade in counterfeit goods has become easier. The two go hand in hand”. See Stuart Adams,
Tackling Counterfeiters in the Middle East, 129 TRADEMARK WORLD 11, 11 (2000); Chow,
supra note 67, at 1.
69. Including motion pictures (on tape), laser discs, DVDs, computer software (on CDROM, CD-R and floppy diskettes), music (on CDs or tapes), toys, toys, handbags, wallets,
backpacks, consumer electronics, sunglasses, and footwear. See Puay Tang, The Social &
Economic Effects of Counterfeiting: A Scoping Study, IP Institute (2001) (detailing seizures
in FY 2000 by the US Customs Services). See also Goldstone & Toren, supra note 67, at 1
(explaining that criminal punishment is appropriate for trafficking in counterfeit goods or
services because it helps promote a country’s economic health and protect consumers).
70. Clothing, footwear, and luxury goods are more easily copied because of advanced
technology that is at the disposal of counterfeiters. Peter Fowler, The Scope and Global
impact of Trade in Counterfeit Goods, http://www.aseansec.org/21385-8.pdf. It is estimated
that one in every 5 items of apparel and footwear sold worldwide are in fact forgeries with
an estimated value of US$ 21 billion for the year 1995. Id. From the outset, it is important
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study, international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods could have
accounted for up to USD 200 billion in 2005. That study further suggests
that counterfeit and pirated goods in international trade grew steadily over
the period 2000-2007 and could amount to up to USD 250 billion in 2007.71
3.3.2 Loss of Foreign Direct Investment
Another cost that is associated with the lack of intellectual property
protection (including for marks) relates to the disincentive to foreign
investors who own intellectual property. These intellectual property
owners will refrain from investing in countries that fail to protect their
intellectual property rights.72 Thus, the loss incurred is twofold: loss of the
Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) and loss of technology transfers that
usually accompany such investments.73 According to this argument,
without such transfer of investments and expertise, developing countries
will continue to “lack . . . advance[s] in health and housing conditions,
skills and training, business practices, etc.”74
to recognize the difficulties associated with estimating the volume of trademark
infringements because of the nature of counterfeiting and the difficulty of measuring the
volume of sales of pirated products. Id. That is because such products are sold on the black
market and, by definition, are not coupled with bookkeeping. Id. Furthermore, it should be
recognized that there is no complete overlap between purchasers who are willing to
purchase original products and purchasers who are willing to purchase counterfeit products.
Id. This is because in the former group there are those who will buy only original products;
and in the latter group there are those who cannot afford original products (or who do not
mind buying fakes). Id. Therefore, a sale of fake products does not necessarily entail a lost
sale in the other group. Id.
71. OECD, MAGNITUDE OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS: AN
UPDATE (Nov. 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/44088872.pdf.
72. However, this premise is not accepted by all. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus,
Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, at v (Centre for Int’l Econ.
Stud., Policy Discussion Paper No. 0022, May 2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=231122 (“[S]trong IPRs alone are not sufficient incentives for firms
to invest in a country. If they were, recent FDI flows to developing economies would have
gone mainly to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. In contrast, China, Brazil, and
other high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak protection would not
have attracted nearly as much FDI.”).
73. FDI occurs in various forms including start-ups of new operations, purchase of
(10% or more) of investment companies, and purchase of stocks and bonds (internationally).
JAMES GERBER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 397 (4th ed. 2008). In the past 3 decades, the
volume of international FDI has risen sharply, from only US$ 105 billion in 1967 to US$
596 billion in 1984 and to a staggering US$ 3.2 trillion in 1998. Id. In 1996, FDI in the US
totaled US$ 630 billion, up from a meager US$ 6.9 billion in 1970. Id. At the same time
(1996), US direct investment abroad totaled US$ 796 billion. Id. Gerber limits the
definition of FDI to physical assets (real estate, factories and business establishment, etc.).
Id. He contends at 397, that FDI’s have become a “major avenue for foreign market entry
and expansion.” Id.
74. Tang, supra note 69, at 60. See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL
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Notwithstanding, some commentators remain rather skeptical of this
argument and contend that trade involving “transfer of technology” to
developing countries is limited to “turnkey projects” and does not entail
real technology transfers.75 Additionally, there is no clear correlation
between lack of intellectual property protection and the withdrawal of FDI.
A clear example of this is China, which despite its problems with
counterfeiting and intellectual property enforcement, continues to enjoy an
influx of FDI.76 What is more, this argument pertaining to loss of
technology investments may be relevant in the case of patents but is much
less so in the case of trademarks. That is because branded goods are
usually imported into developing countries as ready-made products while
the manufacturing skills and the technology associated with these products
remain outside the borders of developing countries.77
3.3.3 Adverse Affects on Innovation and Creativity in Society
A widely accepted argument asserts that a lack of protection for
intellectual property rights will discourage innovation and creativity.
Indeed, if a brand owner cannot protect his brand from unauthorized
copying then he will have no real incentive to maintain the quality of
products sold under his brand.78 Consequently, lack of such protection may
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Mitchel B.
Wallerstein et al. eds., National Academy Press, 1993) (noting the underlying policy
tensions and trends in intellectual property rights development worldwide); Carlos A. Primo
Braga, Carsten Finks & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development, 2000 World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412 (discussing the difficulties that
developing countries face as a result of worldwide changes in intellectual property rights
1993).
75. Saad Nusrullah, Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Rights 17 (July,
2005) (Submitted to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for Summer School
on Intellectual Property) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/5364069/DevelopingCountries-and-Intellectual-Property-Rights-by-Saad-2005 (“After [sic] second Patent Act,
Thailand experienced an increase in technology transfer and FDI. However, most ventures
to date have been ‘turnkey’ projects, where technology is imported and controlled by
foreign experts for a limited purpose. So, this has failed to foster growth in domestic
technology R&D and Thailand remains dependent on technology from industrialized
nations.”).
76. Chow, supra note 67, at 1. See also Tang, supra note 69, at 13 (noting that many
Western multinational corporations have established assembly plants and factories in
China).
77. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, 48 EUR.
ECON. REV. 39, 39 (2004) (“[W]eak protection deters foreign investors in technologyintensive sectors that rely heavily on intellectual property rights. Moreover, the results
indicate that a weak intellectual property regime encourages investors to undertake projects
focusing on distribution rather than local production.”).
78. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 67, at 18 (“To the extent that counterfeited
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ultimately curb innovation and creativity in countries that do not combat
piracy.79
This position, however, seems to overlook the fact that the process of
learning and development is sometimes contingent on copying.80
Interestingly, even the United States, in its economic infancy, did not
adequately protect foreigners' intellectual property rights under the pretense
of boosting local innovation and knowledge through copying.81 Thus, the
argument for preserving the inventiveness and creativity of intellectual
property owners should take into account the identity of the brand owner
and the country in question. Indeed, the question should be: Does the
protection of trademarks in developing countries contribute to the
innovation and creativity in those countries despite their Trademark Deficit
and low Trademark Potential? In view of my findings, it is not possible to
conclude that the CTR is a positive factor in promoting innovation and
creativity in developing countries. However, one cannot rule out any
adverse effects on innovation and creativity in society. One such social
cost might relate to the reduced incentive to maintain the quality of brands.
3.3.4 Losses of Tax Revenues
An additional social cost resulting from counterfeiting relates to lost
tax earnings. Those losses lead to the diversion of national revenues (from
loss of tax revenues) away from public services because counterfeit
products are generally sold through “clandestine channels” in which sales
are neither reported nor taxed. Consequently, anti-piracy advocates submit
that “if there were no revenue losses incurred from counterfeiting, the
revenue collected would have gone to pay for more health and education

goods are permitted to be traded without sanction, incentives to invest in a reputation for
quality work will be undermined.”).
79. PUAY TANG, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEITING: A SCOPING
STUDY, 57-58 (2001).
80. See Bruno S. Frey, Art Fakes--What Fakes?, An Economic View (Inst. for Empirical
Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 14, 1999) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=203210 (concluding that “copies are not necessarily bad but rather
good” because they “create[] utility for persons demanding, and paying for them.”).
81. This counter-argument draws strength from an unlikely historical source, namely
the United States’ non-compliance with British copyright law: “The US did not comply
with British copyright law until 1891, neither was compensating scholars, part of the
American political agenda then.” Tang, supra note 69, at 57. Accord Dru Brenner-Beck,
Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84, 87-88 (1992) (stating that the
United States did not recognize the works of foreign authors until 1891 and as a nation was
one of the foremost pirates of British works); DORON BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS:
INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 86 (2004)
(arguing that “respect for Britain’s intellectual property laws was out of the question” in
early colonial America).
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services.”82
This argument presupposes one crucial element; namely, that the
revenues from the sale of original products or the rendering of services are
taxed by the same country in which such products are sold or such services
are rendered. My findings indicate that developing countries mostly export
commodities with low Trademark Potential, while importing products with
high Trademark Potential.83 As such, the bulk of trademarked goods (and
services) being sold in developing countries are foreign-owned.
Consequently, the only taxable revenues collected by developing countries
are those pertaining to the final sale involving the end consumer minus the
cost of production and transit. Those point of sale revenues constitute only
a fraction of the revenues collected by the foreign brand owner.84 It is also
worth noting that in a post GATT-WTO world in which import tariffs and
customs duties have been greatly reduced, importing countries cannot
offset the losses in sales through customs duties and other tariffs.85 Indeed,
the argument relating to lost tax earnings is most relevant when considering
counterfeiting within brand owning industrialized countries such as the
United States, Japan, and countries of Western Europe, where most of the
brand owning entities originate. But, even in these countries, tax havens
have reduced tax earnings.

82. Tang, supra note 69, at 58. See also NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
AN OVERVIEW 5 (2003), available at
http://www.nathaninc.com/NATHAN/files/CCPAGECONTENT/DOCFILENAME/000050
3252/Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Developing%20Countries.pdf
(noting
that
counterfeiting “impede[s] economic development” as “[c]ash starved governments are
deprived of tax revenues.”).
83. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 81 (“Because the ownership and exports of
intellectual property are concentrated in the hands of firms in a few developed countries, the
effect of TRIPS will be to shift the terms of trade in their favor and away from intellectual
property importer. In turn, profits will be shifted from both developing countries and
developed countries with a comparative disadvantage in intellectual property marketing
toward a few developed economies, the United States in particular.”).
84. In practice, many foreign brand owners operate their own shops and outlets in
developing countries (through licensing or franchising). In such cases, even more revenues
flow outwards into foreign countries in which said brand owners originate, thus reducing
even more the extent of taxable income that flows into the treasury of developing countries.
Consequently, the bulk of revenues from such transactions are not fully taxed by developing
countries but rather by foreign states in which brand owners originate.
85. Elba Cristina Lima Rago, From GATT to WTO: What Has Changed, How it Works
and Where The Multilateral Trade System Is Going To, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9552. See also Hideo Konishi et al.,
Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers 2 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=428346 (noting that “[a]ll countries would agree to immediate
global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers
from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have
no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in the core of a
Kemp-Wan-Grinols customs union game.”).
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3.3.5 Loss of Employment Opportunities
Another cost associated with counterfeiting is the loss of employment
opportunities. This is because the workforce that is producing authentic
products is left partially redundant due to the decline in demand for
authentic products. Furthermore, foreign corporations that cannot secure
their intellectual property in a given territory might be deterred from
manufacturing in such countries (due to their fears of devaluing their
products), thus causing an even greater loss of employment opportunities in
that territory.86
However, this argument cannot be applied in full vigor in the case of
developing countries because the bulk of branded products that are sold in
developing countries are produced oversees and imported as finished
products. Consequently, the bulk of the workforce that is connected with
their production is not based in most developing countries. Additionally, it
is not clear whether Western-controlled production facilities, located in
some developing countries, mostly in East Asia, do in fact benefit those
countries given the low wages and the poor working conditions.87
3.3.6 Jeopardizing the Consumers' Health and Safety
Another social loss pertains to the health hazards that are associated
with the consumption and use of counterfeit products such as foods,
beverages, chemicals, electrical machines, tools, pharmaceutical products,
clothing items (especially for infants), and even spare parts for cars and
aircrafts.88
86. OECD, Leniency Programs to Fight Hard-Core Cartels, in 3 OECD J.
COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y No. 2, 22 (2001). See Tang, supra note 69, at 60 (noting that
producers are “reluctant to manufacture their products in countries where counterfeiting is
prevalent”); Braga et al., supra note 74, at 43 (discussing the difficulties that developing
countries face as a result of worldwide changes in intellectual property rights); Edwin
Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology
Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 112 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (reporting
that a country’s intellectual property regime constitutes a major consideration amongst US
firms evaluating that country’s suitability for direct investment).
87. See Richard M. Locke et al., Virtue Out of Necessity?: Compliance, Commitment
and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains (MIT Sloan School
Working Paper 4719-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286142; Bello, supra
note 48 (stating that Klein argues Nike similarly exploited young workers by selling their
products in the North, while denying their rights as workers through eliminating permanent
employment, doing away with benefits, paying minimum wage, hiring part-time
employment and severing the last non-instrumental tie by contracting workers from temp
agencies).
88. Fake goods are more prone to contain components or ingredients of an inferior
quality, thus making them less reliable and more prone to hurt the consumer. Goldstone &
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However, there is no empirical data that confirms a correlation
between poisoning or injury incidents and the consumption of foods and
beverages that are marketed under another producer’s mark or under a
mark that is confusingly similar to it. Similarly, no data proves widespread
injuries from the use of counterfeit items of clothing or parts thereof. In the
case of counterfeit pharmaceutical products, the danger appears more
plausible.89 The problem here does not lie solely with the producers, but
also with consumers because their conduct suggests a readiness to assume
the risk that is associated with the consumption or use of such products.
Indeed, some research proposes the harsh question that if consumers do not
perceive these potential dangers (or at least the less obvious and imminent
ones) as a real cost, why should regulators step in to protect them? Indeed,
why not respect their wishes to purchase what they please, especially in
cases that do not involve post-sale confusion by other parties?90

Toren, supra note 67, at 8-9. The danger in this case is mainly from clothing items bearing
cheap and/or toxic fumes or from the possibility of detachable parts that may cause choking
(buttons and other parts). Id. Trademarks and service marks play a vital role in modern
society. Id. at 8. For consumers who cannot investigate the merits of every product they
buy or service they use, marks can provide a uniquely reliable source of information about
potential purchases. Id. For manufacturers, trademarks crystallize the good will they have
built up over time and ensure that customers will continue to purchase their products. Id.
Counterfeiting can destroy these important benefits, cheating customers, manufacturers,
legitimate retailers, and society at large. Id. In the most extreme cases, it poses a threat to
public health and safety. Id. at 9. See also International Trademark Association,
Counterfeiting,
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1534&Itemid=&getco
ntent=4 (“Although some believe counterfeiting is a victimless crime, it has many farreaching consequences. To begin with, depending upon the nature of the product being
counterfeited, there can be serious health and safety concerns—as, for example, in the case
of counterfeit baby formula, drugs, car parts, or electronic goods. Needless to say,
counterfeiting damages trademark owners’ goodwill in their products and detracts from their
profits . . . .”).
89. See Amir H. Khoury, The “Public Health” of the Conventional International Patent
Régime & The Ethics of “Ethicals:” Access to Patented Medicines, 26 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 25, 25 (2008) (claiming that many residents in third world countries cannot afford
to buy original products, the most striking example being medicines like the AID-HIV
Cocktail).
90. See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“Post-sale confusion occurs when use of a trademark leads individuals (other
than the purchaser) mistakenly to believe that a product was manufactured by the
trademark-holder.”). CBC News In Depth, Counterfeit Goods: Is Your Buy Real or Fake?
And
Why
Should
You
Care?,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/consumers/counterfeit.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2007)
(“[A] recent . . . poll found that two in five Canadians said they purchased counterfeit
goods.”).
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3.3.7 Encouraging Organized Crime
The counterfeiting industry, much like other industries, requires
organization as well as a well-oiled manufacturing and marketing
infrastructure. It is therefore not surprising that this industry is classified as
a form of “organized crime”.91 However, in the context of developing
countries, it is not at all clear that local society suffers from the fact that it
buys fake consumer goods instead of original products owned by
manufacturers originating in the United States, Japan, or Europe. Indeed,
as stated above, even European consumers are generally not bothered by
the fact that such fake products are produced by crime syndicates in the Far
East.
3.3.8 Losses to Consumers
When considering the losses to the consumer as a result of lack of
trademark protection, there is a general tendency to refer to the
“consumers” in a collective manner as if they were a coherent group of
individuals with similar needs and expectations.92 However, this is not the
case.
One commentary distinguishes between two types of consumers that
purchase counterfeit products based on the degree of their informed choice
regarding that purchase. One group within the general body of consumers
willfully and knowingly engages in purchasing counterfeit products.
According to one researcher, customers worldwide appear to be
consciously choosing to purchase items that are not genuine and without
regard for their inherent inferiority.93 A second group of consumers is
unwittingly lured into such transactions.
The common factor behind the actions of the two groups is their
91. See Tang, supra note 69, at 59 (“[Crime] [s]yndicates are the big operators of
counterfeiting activity in the Philippines and Thailand.”); INTERNATIONAL
ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2005), available
at http://www.iacc.org/resources/IACC_WhitePaper.pdf (explaining the links between
counterfeiting, piracy and organized crime).
92. See OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, in 3 OECD J.
COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y No. 2, 123 (2001) (explaining that “[f]rom a consumer
perspective, intellectual property rights (IPRs) involve a tradeoff between short and long run
gain. In the short run, consumers would be better off if businesses were free to copy the
results of one another’s creative efforts, thus helping ensure that products incorporating IPR
are priced close to marginal cost. In the long run, however, consumers would suffer if they
had to forgo the fruits of activities IPRs are designed to encourage.”).
93. See Tang, supra note 69, at 58 (claiming that consumers are able to identify the
authenticity of the product since “the price itself signals that they are counterfeit items”).
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underlying motive to pay less.94 In this regard, one commentary
acknowledges that consumers are constantly seeking to acquire well-known
brands at cheaper prices. Ironically, consumers may boast of buying
(original looking) fakes for much less than the original products. As such,
counterfeiting should in large part be blamed on the consumers themselves
because counterfeiters are merely “traders exploiting an opportunity.”95
Here it may be possible to challenge the right to limit commercial activity
that does not pose a threat of confusion. However, this is beyond the limits
of this research.
An additional potential “consumer loss” emanates from the fact that
while consumers might, in nominal sum, pay less for a product that is fake,
they end up paying an “excessive price for an inferior product.”96 Indeed,
when consumers elect to purchase cheap items of inferior quality, they
might ultimately end up paying more by way of maintenance or even
sustaining bodily harm.
A third type of loss that might be suffered by consumers emanates
from the possibility that brand owning entities would refrain from selling
their products in some countries, thus, effectively reducing the scope of
consumer choice in that country.97 However, no empirical research is
provided in support of this contention. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a
foreign brand-owning corporation would opt to commit commercial suicide
by willfully electing not to sell their products in a given jurisdiction and
thus intentionally reducing its revenues to zero. It should be noted that
such producers (brand owners) cannot even achieve short term success (as
an educational exercise) because consumers (in that specific jurisdiction)
would still be able to obtain authentic products through parallel imports.
Furthermore, the local industry might even benefit because in the absence
of dominant brands, domestic manufacturers would be able to expand their
share in the market.
In conclusion, when applied to developing countries, the cost analysis
approach is somewhat less convincing given the low Trademark Potential
therein. However, adopting an approach that effectively abolishes
trademarks would be resisted by both brand owners and developed
countries. Furthermore, that approach would undermine the moral basis of
protection and would entail negative effects and costs that cannot be
overlooked. In my opinion, formulating the best reaction to CTR involves
taking into consideration the varying levels of Trademark Potential and the
Trademark Balance, the interests of local consumers and producers, and
94. See Adams, supra note 68, at 11 (stating that the opportunity to counterfeit is a
byproduct of consumers desire for cheap prices on well-known brand products).
95. Id.
96. Tang, supra note 69, at 58.
97. Id. at 9.
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the need to promote fair competition.
SECTION FOUR: THE MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH: CREATING A
NEOCONVENTIONAL TRADEMARK RÉGIME
After rejecting both of the aforementioned extreme solutions, i.e., full
adoption or full rejection, it appears that the only viable trademark régime
is one that presents a middle ground approach that contributes towards
reducing the Trademark Deficit of developing countries and raises their
Trademark Potential while not completely deviating from the standards of
the CTR. Ideally, such a solution would contribute towards reversing the
negative effects of the current trademark régime while preserving the moral
basis of trademark protection and avoiding unnecessary political and
commercial conflicts with industrialized brand-owning countries.
This concept of a middle ground approach has been recognized as the
only workable approach in the wider context of development of nonindustrialized countries (non-ICs). In this context, one commentary
submits that:
“If, as seems inevitable, foreign interests are to be involved in
economic activities, then the ways in which they blend with
indigenous inputs becomes of great importance. It would be
imperative for non-ICs to pursue selective policies that promote
and extend positive benefits but prevent harmful effects that
foreign interests may entail. This might be the only way of
realizing policies arising from a correct assessment of the
strength and weakness of the respective non-ICs in light of the
international situation as a whole. . . . Neither complete insulation
nor wide-open integration but a policy of enlightened
discrimination would present the correct answer.”98
Furthermore, in this context one pre-TRIPS commentary has observed
that:
“Intellectual property rights are independently defined and granted by
all nations. Thus, protection of these rights is territorial. Each nation must
choose the composition and extent of the protection it will provide and
structure its laws to accomplish its political and economic objectives.
Historically, this choice has reflected a country’s evaluation of the costs
and benefits of a particular level of protection, and the effect on the
country’s economic objectives. The choice of an ideal level of protection,
ranging from free access to intellectual property at one extreme to complete
protection at the other, will change as the country develops and its
98. Paul Streeten, Development Dichotomies, 11 WORLD DEV. 875, 883 (1983). See
also ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining the effects of the legal transportation of
ICs’ laws into non-ICs’ laws).
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economic needs change. This change is largely due to the accompanying
change in the calculation of costs and benefits at the different stages of
development.”99
In this section, I explore some amendments that may be entered into
for the CTR in order to introduce changes from within the existing system
while still preserving its continuity. This reformulation of the CTR would
create what I refer to as a NeoConventional Trademark Régime.
4.1 Reinvigorating Comparative Advertising
Comparative advertising is a powerful marketing tool, whereby one
party may promote its brand by comparing its products (or services) with
its rivals’ products. This measure helps to draw the consumers’ attention to
competing products of comparable quality, which are sold under other
brands. This legal tool already exists in various national laws.100 It can
also be derived from a notion of free speech and act as a counterbalance to
unlimited trademark rights.101
According to one observer “[c]omparative advertising, when truthful
and non-deceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and
assists them in making rational purchase decisions. It encourages product
improvement and innovation and can lead to lower prices in the market
place.”102 The use of comparative advertising is further justified because
trademarks, especially in the modern era, have expanded their role beyond
the basic, albeit important, function of indicating the source of products and
have acquired an independent value of their own. Furthermore, leading
brands now command strong loyalty by consumers who are unaware of the
qualities (or even the existence) of alternative products marketed under
lesser known brands.
Under conditions of “perfect competition” the products of different
99. Brenner–Beck, supra note 81, at 85 (internal citations omitted).
100. See, e.g., Manuel Morasch, Comparative Advertising—A Comparative Study of
Trade-mark Laws and Competition Laws in Canada and the European Union (2004) (faculty
of
law
dissertation,
thesis,
University
of
Toronto),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=685602 (discussing comparative advertising laws in the United
States and Canada).
101. See, e.g., Filippo M. Cinotti, “Fair Use” of Comparative Advertising Under the
1995 Federal Dilution Act, 37(1) IDEA 133 (1996) (exploring the implications of “fair use”
and the First Amendment for comparative advertising); Samia M. Kirmani, Cross-Border
Comparative Advertizing in the European Union, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 201
(1996) (noting recent debate over the trade impacts of comparative advertising laws in
European nations).
102. Cassels Brock, Apples to Oranges Comparative Advertising, May 22, 2004,
http://www.hg.org/articles/article_396.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (citing Energizer v.
Duracell (Australia), where the court rejected the notion that comparative advertising should
be subjected to increased scrutiny).
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sellers constitute perfect substitutes from the consumer’s point of view and
demand is determined by the price of a given product or service. In this
market of “perfect competition,” business would compete through the price
of the products sold. However, in the modern market, products are not
homogeneous. In this market, buyers and sellers do not have full
knowledge of market conditions and there are barriers to entry and exit.
Furthermore, the consumer’s “imperfect” knowledge of the selection of
products leads him or her to evaluate one brand over-optimistically while
being excessively pessimistic about others. Research concludes that these
manifestations of “loyalty” are clearer among individual (household)
consumers whom are prone to commit both types of errors because they
purchase a limited amount of a wide range of products and because they
cannot afford the assistance of trained experts. Thus, their product
selection is typically based on clues “many of which are not accurate
indicators of [the] products’ value or quality.”103 It is the combination of
these two errors that ultimately lead consumers to develop unsubstantiated
“loyalty” to some brands over others. Thus, the consumer’s “Brand
Loyalty” affects or predetermines the consumer’s future choice.
Comparative advertising is intended to offset this imbalance.104
103. Donald F. Cox, The Sorting Rule Model of the Consumer Product Evaluation
Process, in RISK TAKING AND INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 324-68
(Donald Cox ed., 1976); A.G. BEDIAN, CONSUMER PERCEPTION OF PRICE AS AN INDICATOR
OF PRODUCT QUALITY, MSU Business Topics 59 (Summer 1971); A.G. Woodside, Relation
of Price to Perception of Quality of New Products, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 116, 116 (1974);
R.W. Olshavsky & T.A. Miller, Consumer Expectations, Product Performance and
Perceived Product Quality, 9 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 19, 19 (1972). Therefore, it is not
surprising that “errors of commission could be made persistently over time, all based on
nothing more than the mere existence of brands for experience goods. This is generally
called brand loyalty or trade mark allegiance.” UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 7. This report
defines “experience goods” as those goods “whose utility can be evaluated only after their
purchase (e.g. canned foods, drinks, soaps, motor-cars, appliances).” Id. Other goods
whose quality and distinct features can be judged by a simple inspection are referred to as
“search goods;” fresh fruits and vegetables are included in this latter group. Id.
Understandably, consumers are less prone to commit purchasing errors with respect to
“selection goods” because they can independently and cheaply collect information about
different products. Ross M. Cunningham, Brand Loyalty--What, Where, How Much?, 34
HARV. BUS. REV. 116, 116 (1956). That study found that “a significant amount of brand
loyalty to individual products does exist – more, indeed, than has hitherto been realized by
many marketing executives”. Id. That study concludes that “[t]here are many instances
where 90% or more of a family’s purchases have been concentrated on a single brand over
three whole years.” Id. That empirical research encompassed several experience goods and
found that this pattern of behavior runs across the entire socioeconomic spectrum of
consumers. Id. at 117.
104. The rationale underlying “Brand Loyalty” is that the market operates under
conditions of imperfect competition. UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 7. As such the consumer
has imperfect knowledge of the products that he desires and the availability of alternatives
to such products. Id. Thus, the consumer can commit two types of errors, “commission”
and “omission.” Id. The former occurs when the consumer makes a purchase based on “an
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The modern market reflects a system of “imperfect competition”
wherein similar products do not compete on an equal footing and non-price
competition is prevalent. Indeed, in the modern market where conditions
of “imperfect competition” dominate the scene, producers are able to
compete through “product differentiation” and competing products
constitute only “close substitutes” of each other.105 Various factors (the
trademark included) can contribute to establishing product
differentiation.106 The economic structure of developing countries and their
relatively limited diversification lead to a situation whereby a few foreign
firms dominate its consumer market, resulting in oligopolies or even
monopolies. And as stated above, under these conditions of imperfect
competition, producers are able to invoke various non-price measures (such
as trademarks) that are able to influence the consumers’ choice and
demand.
In view of this “imperfect competition,” as well as product
differentiation and brand loyalty, it is evident that trademarks do carry a
substantial independent value that influences or even determines consumer
demand.107 Therefore, despite the legal equality that is afforded to all
trademarks, this does not entail equality in the impact of trademarks and
their market foothold. This state of affairs provides the justification to the
(measured) use of comparative advertising.
It is worth noting that the comparative advertising tool has been
recognized in the laws of many countries. Suffice it to mention, EU
Directive 97/55/EC that has amended an earlier Directive (84/450/EEC),

inflated or excessively favorable, pre-purchase assessment of the goods.” Id. This type of
error could cause the consumer to get less than he bargained for. Id. The later type of error
occurs when the consumer “demands less than he would if he had full knowledge” of all
alternative products on the market. Id.
105. See UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 6 (noting that “while in perfect competition the
cross elasticity of demand between different pairs of outputs will approach infinity, such
elasticity will be perceptible and finite in the case of competition through product
differentiation.”).
106. See E.H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 56-62 (5th ed. 1947) (explaining that both
trademarks and patents “make a product unique in certain respects; this is its monopolistic
aspect. Each leaves room for other commodities almost but not quite like it; this is its
competitive aspect.”). The differentiation achieved through trademarks exceeds that of
patents and industrial designs because the protection that is granted to trademarks is not
limited in time and trademarks are connected with the product (or service in the case of a
service mark) and can visually be perceived by the consumer in a clear and direct manner.
Id. Despite this distinction, trademarks and patents possess similar monopolistic and
competitive qualities. Id.
107. See, e.g., Baila Caledonia, Assessing a Company’s Most Valuable Assets:
Conducting an Intellectual Property Audit, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (June 4, 2001),
available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=11872 (explaining the worth of
intellectual property and the need to assess its true value).
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deals with misleading advertising. Furthermore, the national laws of
European countries are now bound by these norms and provide conditional
recognition of comparative advertising. The most vivid example of this
appears in German law, which recognizes comparative advertising within
the boundaries of actions that are not misleading.108 Similarly, the
International Trademark Association has called on all countries to “permit
comparative advertising so long as there are legal controls to prevent harm
and/or damage to the marks of competitors, and to prevent explicit or
implicit false or misleading representations or other forms of unfair
competition.”109 In line with this approach, if the comparative advertising
mechanism is abused, then the brand owner can invoke legal recourse in
the form of both monetary damages and “corrective advertising” at the
expense of the infringer.110
I submit that the use of the comparative advertising tool should be
further enhanced so as to make it a central feature in existing commercial
brands. This type of comparative advertising is especially needed in
developing countries in view of the marketing power that is enjoyed by
foreign brands, and in order to enable local brands to compete in the
market. Consequently, where comparative advertising is conducted within
the boundaries of truth and objectivity, it should be allowed and even
encouraged. This legal tool is especially justified in view of the imperfect
market conditions and brand loyalty that strong brands command as well as
the low Trademark Potential of countries. Comparative advertising should
be pursued vigorously and become standard procedure in the marketing
operations of newcomer states. In this regard, the legal maneuvering space
should be expanded. This can be achieved by way of amending the CTR
and ultimately trademark laws on the national level. For example, the law
should provide a clear defense involving the bona fide use of another’s
mark, so long as it is informative and truthful. Furthermore, the judiciary
may also contribute to the successful use of comparative advertising by
taking a more lenient stance towards prospective infringers. Herein lies a
108. See Andrea Lensing-Kramer & Peter Ruess, Recent Developments in Comparative
Advertising and the Implications for Trademark Law in Germany, 94 TMR 1315, 1332-34
(2004) (explaining Germany’s movement away from strict prohibition of using a
competitor’s trademark in advertising, to allowing it so long as the advertisement is not
misleading); Ulf Doepner & Frank-Erich Hufnagel, German Courts Implement the EU
Directive 97/55/EC--A Fundamental Shift in the Law on Comparative Advertising?, 88
TRADEMARK REP. 537, 537 (1998) (describing how the German courts have implemented
the new rule).
109. INTA,
Comparative
Advertising,
March
3,
1998,
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=217&Itemid=153&get
content=3.
110. See Paul E. Pompeo, To Tell the Truth: Comparative Advertising and Lanham Act
Section 43(a), 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 565, 577-80 (1987) (describing court-imposed penalties
for abuse of comparative advertising).
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quandary regarding the optimal scope of this tool. On the one hand, there
is the view that comparative advertising should be tolerated as long as it
does not present the consumer public with factually misleading
information. A more reserved view would be that comparative advertising
should not be used in order to undermine trademark rights or to reduce the
incentive of trademark owners to maintain quality. While the first
approach is one that recognizes the need to use trademarks in creative ways
(e.g., stepping on two competitors canned beverages to get the third brand
of beverages), the latter approach is more concerned with the ramifications
of such use on overall competition in the market and on the dilution or
tarnishment of the marks. This latter view would most likely caution
against the opportunistic use of another's trademark. Indeed, the latter
approach would tolerate comparative advertising so far as it provides
consumers with access to information. The latter approach would be
inclined to view unrestricted comparative advertising as an abuse of
trademark rights under the pretence of market entry.
Given the two sides of the argument, my view is that the use of
comparative advertising should be restrained lest it becomes a tool for
circumventing the laws of unfair competition. My advocacy for the
proactive use of comparative advertising as a tool for assisting newcomer
states does not overlook the public interest of preserving competition. It is
merely an attempt to reinvigorate competition within the bounds of open
and accessible information. Therefore, in order for the comparative
advertising tool to be effective, there needs to be a clear commitment
within the national trademark system towards ensuring commerciallyoriented free speech. In my view, reservations about the Freedom of
Commercial Expressions Doctrine do not derogate from the need to allow
the free flow of relevant information to consumers, even at the cost of
limiting the scope of trademark rights.111 In other words, the legal culture
within the relevant national jurisdiction needs to be such that market
players can utilize this tool without fear or hesitation, so long as it does not
produce misleading information.112 Absent such immunity it would not be
possible to facilitate the unimpeded circulation of information and the
comparative advertising tool would remain redundant.
In addition to all of the above, it is worth noting that while, in theory,
this legal tool can be used by newcomers and non-newcomers alike, its
111. See ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION xxiv (2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=545142 (dismantling the
arguments put forth by supporters of the commercial expression doctrine).
112. See Francesca Barigozzi & Martin Peitz, Comparative Advertising and Competition
Policy 33-34 (Int’l Univ. in Germany, Working Paper No. 19, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=699583 (discussing how both legal practice and consumer
perception affect whether comparative advertising firms will make false or truthful
statements).
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projected use will predominantly be by the former group. That is because
while newcomers will be keen to inform and educate consumers about their
products that are similar in quality to existing products (that are sold under
dominant brands), the owners of established brands will not have an
interest in “promoting” a competitor's lesser-known brand. Indeed, the use
of comparative advertising is merely a tool to foster market entry by lesserknown brands covering products and services that are comparable in
quality with products that are covered by leading brands.113 Clearly, such a
policy will not be effective in cases where the consumer seeks to purchase
goods because of the specific (foreign) brands that they are sold under. In
those cases the consumer would be making the selection not based on the
quality-price axis, but rather, on the social-cosmopolitan image that the
foreign brands denote.114 But if that is true, the role of the comparative
advertising mechanism remains relevant for many consumers, especially
for products that are purchased but not displayed by their owners. This is
especially true for car parts and home products.
4.2 Tolerating “Association” Advertising
In addition to the (classic) comparative advertising tool as described
above, I propose taking comparative advertising to new heights. This
proposal involves the use of a new tool, which I refer to here as association
advertising. This tool would allow domestic brand owners to go a step
further in comparative advertising and to actually use another’s brand on
their respective products. The aim of this use would be to indicate to the
consumer the characteristics of products marketed under other lesserknown brands. In other words, the aim would be to create, in the minds of
consumers, a direct “association” between rival brands, namely that of the
dominant market player and that of the newcomer. Such a method could be
used, for example, to indicate the “compatibility” of products, especially in
the case of spare parts, i.e., that a certain product is compatible with other

113. See Smita Sharma, Onslaught of Global Brands--Indian Brands Fight Back!!!, 1
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704266 (“Brands can [] survive by delivering a
value advantage over the new brands”); see also Charles A. Rarick, Mecca-Cola: A Protest
Brand Makes its Mark, 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122863 (discussing
how companies such as Mecca-Cola, a Coca-Cola substitute, has been successful in
countries with large Muslim populations); Nebahat Tokatli, Asymmetrical Power Relations
and Upgrading Among Suppliers of Global Clothing Brands: Hugo Boss in Turkey, 7 J.
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 67, 69-70 (2007) (citing Hugo Boss as an example of a small firm that
encroached a market that was already dominated by leading brands).
114. See Geoffrey Jones, Blonde and Blue-Eyed? Globalizing Beauty, c.1945-c.1980, 61
ECON. HIST. REV. 125, 150 (2008) (highlighting that beauty ideals vary from country to
country and that consumers select their cosmetics based on whether the company matches
their beauty ideal).
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competitors’ products. This is particularly useful in cases involving the use
of spare parts for machines or refills for relevant products.115 This method
is quite similar to the love/like slogans that are used in advertising.116 This
form of association advertising would allow for actual informative use of
another’s brand on one’s own product in order to highlight its substitutive
value. Another, more radical form of association advertising would
sanction the use, by newcomers, of another's mark in order to indicate the
“generic” qualities of their own product. This can be referred to as
“Substitute” association advertising. Clearly, this more radical form of
association advertising should be restricted to cases where the party
requesting its use is able to establish that its competitor’s brand dominates
that market to an extent that renders any (regular) competition futile. In
other words, it should be applied only in cases involving sectors that are
dominated by specific brands effectively creating a form of “Brand
Antitrust.” As such, this solution can only provide partial and limited relief
to brand owners originating in developing countries. Its use would be
contingent on the commercial status of established brands. This, in turn,
would ensure that use of those brands does not become a method for free
riding or for creating confusion among consumers in relation to brands of
similar market strength.
The justification for my proposed association advertising emanates
from various sources. The initial justification rests on utilitarian theory.
Indeed, if the aim of the intellectual property system is to promote social
benefits, then the regulator should be inclined to adopt any system that
enhances competition and maximizes social benefits. This would include
cases where consumers are afforded maximum information with minimum
search costs. Other research along these lines have called for removing
government restrictions on advertising expression (as copyright protected
content) and on slogans (as trademarks) in order to enhance market
competition by increasing the “images and language available for use in
advertising.”117 The second tier for justifying association advertising rests
on the already existing trend of greater leniency when it comes to the
interface between trademark law and the need to promote market
competition. This has become increasingly prevalent in the virtual sphere.
There it has been argued that trademark triggered pop-up ads or search
result ads should be tolerated if they are properly indentified and not
115. See Gillette v. Amir Shivook (citing the example of razors as compatible with
Gillette shavers); Kenwood case (Israel) (discussing spare parts for Kenwood mixers).
116. See Diane M. Reed, Use of "Love/Like" Slogans in Advertising: Is the Trademark
Owner Protected? 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 102 (1989) (discussing how advertisements
that mention a competitors’ name in its slogan have become popular; for example, “If You
Like [Their Product], You’ll Love [Our Product]”).
117. Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 189, 263 (2006).
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misleading.118 This approach has been further bolstered by the notion that
trademarks can be used as keywords by internet search engines because the
Internet is analogous to an “information mall” that should be made
accessible to all; information should flow freely without being restricted by
intellectual property rights.119 A third tier of justification for association
advertising rests on the fact that consumers’ choice is in many cases
superficial because it is not as a result of a clear deductive process, but is
influenced and shaped by psychological, as well as, irrational factors.120
4.3 Limiting the Scope of Protection of Well-Known Marks
The overly broad coverage of well-known marks has been a topic for
concern in research literature. The concern has focused on the scope of
protection that the law should grant to well-known marks in order for them
not to become overly dominant. These marks not only control the market,
but also create the “need” to purchase products or services that are covered
by them. Indeed, these leading marks raise the volume of imports and
could, ultimately, increase the dependence of local consumers on foreign
brands. Consequently, some literature has been highly apprehensive about
granting broad protection to well-known marks that are not registered in a
given jurisdiction.121 This is not surprising given the imbalance in the
terms of brand-holdings between the industrialized brand-owning countries
and developing countries.

118. See Kendall Bodden, Pop Goes the Trademark? Competitive Advertizing on the
Internet, 1 SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH. 12, 12 (2005) (discussing current case law and
legislation that affects internet advertising, specifically trademark-triggered advertisements
and “pop-up” ads).
119. See Matim Li v. Crazy Line (District Court of Tel Aviv); See also Kurt M.
Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner
Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 574-75 (2002) (asserting that keyword banner
advertisements should be treated as trademark fair use and should not lead to liability).
120. See Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 985 (2007) (noting that the
courts have stretched the element of likelihood of confusion, in trademark cases to include
irrational consumer decisions).
121. See Maxim Grinberg, The WIPO Joint Recommendation Protecting Well-Known
Marks and the Forgotten Goodwill, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2005) (suggesting
that the overbroad territorial protection proposed by the Joint Recommendation from the
World Intellectual Property Organization dealing with protection of well-known trademarks
undermines important policies of U.S. trademark law: it allows the attainment of
enforceable trademark rights without investment in the trademark's goodwill and diminishes
the quantity of available trademarks to U.S. entrepreneurs, raising their cost of entry into the
market); David Vaver, Unconventional and Well-Known Trade Marks, 8 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 18 (2005) (stating that expanded protection accorded to these marks is not selfevidently a good thing in public policy terms and concluding that reforming the law is not
the same as reforming it).
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In light of this state of affairs, it might be necessary to reduce the level
of protection that is afforded to well-known marks that have not been
registered in a given developing country. In this way, developing countries
would limit the protection granted to well-known marks to only those
marks that are registered in their respective jurisdictions.122 Developing
countries would only implement article 16(3) of TRIPS with respect to
well-known marks that are registered in the relevant jurisdiction.123 In
other words, those countries would be exempted from implementing article
6bis of the Paris Convention in relation to well-known marks that are not
registered in the given jurisdiction.124 It is worth noting that such a step
may be a setback for the owners of well-known marks which are not
registered in the relevant jurisdiction. However, such a setback, if it is
indeed present, could very well be offset by the tort of passing-off. That
tort could provide sufficient protection for marks that enjoy renown but
which are not formally registered with the national trademark office.125
An additional method in which to further limit the clout of wellknown marks would be to lower the benchmark of generic marks, making it
possible to classify well-known marks as generic names thus allowing them
to be used by people other than their original owners.126 The aim of such
an exercise would be to deflate the impact of leading foreign brands.
Understandably, such a step is expected to encounter stiff resistance by
industrialized, brand-owning countries. Therefore, and in order to shore up
support for such an undertaking, those countries would need to receive
some form of compensation. This compensation might be achieved by
establishing a centralized international registration for well-known marks
or by reducing the registration fees for marks that are deemed to be wellknown.
122. In that case, well known marks that are also registered in the relevant jurisdiction
would be subject to the other restrictions that are detailed in this section.
123. In developed, industrialized countries, the full application of Article 6bis of The
Paris Convention and Article 16 of TRIPS, is warranted because it is assumed that the
industries in those countries have a real opportunity at competition.
124. The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio, if their legislation so permits, or at
the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the
use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of
registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of
any such well–known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
125. See Ng Siew Kuan, Foreign Traders and the Law of Passing-Off: The Requirement
of Goodwill within the Jurisdiction, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 372, 373 (1991) (examining the
common law tort of passing-off).
126. See Dev Saif Gangjee, Say Cheese! A Sharper Image of Generic Use Through the
Lens of Feta, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 172, 172 (2007) (discussing the legal and political debate
on whether Feta cheese should be deemed a generic term).
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4.4 Reducing the Impact of Leading Foreign Brands
One way to reduce the influence of foreign brands on local consumers
might be to impose pricing restrictions on products sold under leading
foreign brands so that the owners of such brands do not abuse the
persuasive value that their brands enjoy. By keeping the prices of leading
products at bay, developing countries could better ensure that their
domestic consumers do not end up paying an excessive price for products
that they feel compelled to buy. However, such conduct is contrary to the
principles of open and free trade as prescribed by the WTO-GATT
framework. Such conduct can be considered an unwarranted intervention
in trade. However, because consumers are operating in a market of
imperfect competition, they should be protected from being trapped in their
own “brand loyalty.” This is of special relevance in the case of products or
services that have aspiring local substitutes that are put on the market under
lesser-known brands.127 A counter argument might suggest that there is no
need to intervene to lower the price of leading brands because the rule of
supply and demand will offset any excessive pricing or disproportionate
market control. According to this approach, increasing rather than
lowering prices of such goods would curb the power of leading brands.
Regardless, price intervention remains a very problematic concept and is
liable to create a slippery slope effect that could lead to the complete loss
of market competition and to excessive governmental regulation of free
markets.
Furthermore, in order to counter the sway of foreign brands and the
scope of exposure that they enjoy, it may be possible to limit the scope and
intensity of their advertising activity by setting a quota for advertising of
foreign brands. This is intended to bridge the rift between the advertising
capability of domestic and foreign brands and would allow the consumers
to be proportionally more exposed to domestic brands that compete with
foreign brands over the same consumer segment. These controls can be
achieved by applying antitrust rationales as will be detailed in Section 4.6
below.
A third way to possibly limit the hegemonic impact of leading foreign
brands is by openly encouraging parallel imports of (gray market) goods.
Conceptually speaking, the TRIPS agreement does not conclusively
regulate parallel imports. It does, however, grant member-states the
freedom to determine the scope of those imports. Therefore, developing
countries can, if they choose, adopt a legal norm allowing for unrestricted
127. See Bharat N. Anand & Ron Shachar, Brands, Information, and Loyalty 22-23
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Competition & Strategy Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 00069, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240792 (arguing that consumers may
become attached to particular brands because they lack information about substitutes).
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parallel imports. In this regard, developing countries can embrace the
doctrine of International Exhaustion of trademark rights.128 Under that
doctrine, a brand owner’s rights are exhausted after the first sale of the
product bearing the mark, thus permitting the product to be imported into
any other jurisdiction notwithstanding the right of sole use that attaches to
trademarks.129 That being said, it is important to bear in mind that the
impact of parallel imports on developing countries is limited in scope
because of the fact that most parallel imports are directed to rich markets in
which there is still a chance to generate profits from parallel imports that
originate in poorer countries.130 Thus, in this context, the beneficial impact
of parallel imports on developing countries is questionable.131 A fortiori,
parallel imports would not directly contribute to raising the Trademark
Potential or the Trademark Balance of developing countries. However, by
allowing various market actors to import the same branded goods, market
competition would be enhanced and the price of these products would be
reduced. In my view, the latter two tools, i.e., parallel imports and the
imposition of limitations on advertising, are more likely to take root than
the first, more radical idea of intervening in the price of products.
4.5 Promoting the Use and Registration of Domestic Trademarks
In addition to the low Trademark Potential of developing countries
and the control of markets in developing countries by multinational
corporations, there is an acute need to promote national awareness about
the power of trademarks.132 Indeed, in a world in which product promotion
128. This is the case in some countries including Australia, Japan, and Israel.
129. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, Parallel Imports and Price Controls 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12423, 2006), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=923346.
130. See Romana L. Autrey & Francesco Bova, Gray Markets and Multinational
Transfer Pricing 2-4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-098, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351883 (creating a model to examine the effects of gray markets
on relatively richer countries); see also Charles A. Rarick, First Black, Now Gray: The
Increasingly Difficult Task of International Brand Protection (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112463 (discussing how counterfeit New Balance shoes made in a
relatively poorer country, China, were then imported into a relatively richer country, Japan).
131. See generally Mattias Ganslandt & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights,
Parallel
Imports
and
Strategic
Behavior
40
(2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982241 (suggesting that restraints on parallel trade may actually
lead to the distribution of essential medicines to poor countries); Keith E. Maskus & Chen
Yongmin, Parallel Imports in a Model of Vertical Distribution: Theory, Evidence and
Policy, 7 PAC. ECON. REV. 319, 321 (2002) (discussing existing literature, which suggests
that developing countries prefer not to restrict parallel trade).
132. See VIDA SANDOR, TRADEMARKS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 32 (Licensing
Executive Soc’y Int’l ed., Akade’miai Kiado’, 1981) (noting that even when it is possible
for developing countries to avail themselves of trademarks, they often fail to do so). A
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and marketing is no less important than production itself, the publicity of
the brand has a decisive effect on consumer choice. Thus, by promoting
the concept of a national brand, I predict that producers in developing
countries will be able to secure a larger portion of the domestic branding
market.
When doing this, producers should first determine the identity of their
potential consumers and then create a brand that would be appealing to
their tastes; one that they can identify with. Ideally, producers in
developing countries should invest in increasing their respective brands’
appeal through attractive packaging. Even this seemingly “superficial”
component is crucial in the contest for the hearts and minds of
consumers.133
Local producers should be encouraged to create new and elegant
brands based on distinct features of local culture that might capture the
consumers’ imagination.
In this regard, UNCTAD suggests that
developing countries should use trademarks that indicate names of
historical or famous personalities as well as names of internationally
recognized locations within developing countries. Potential trademarks
could be: Great Wall of China, Cleopatra, Petra, Sphinx, Jordan River,
Sinai, Red Sea, Everest, Sahara, Victoria Falls, and Dead Sea.134 Such
brands may even capture the imagination and attention of consumers in the
West. A living example along these lines is the Mecca-Cola brand
covering a cola beverage, which has been competing with internationally
renowned brands such as Coca Cola,135 Pepsi Cola, and RC Cola. As could

striking example of such a lack of awareness involves Oriental carpets, and the process
European merchants’ initiated to regulate the use of indications of origin when identifying
carpets. Id. In 1970, the Association of Oriental Carpet Traders in Switzerland reportedly
published a list of trade names to be applied in carpet trade. Id. Thus, in Switzerland names
like Tabris, Serabent, and Bochara are only used with respect to hand-made carpets,
produced in those Iranian towns, and the mark Barber is applied to carpets made in North
Africa. Id. As reflected in this case involving geographic indications and/or indications of
origin, producers in developing countries are generally unaware of the marketing power of
trademarks and indications of origin. Id. at 33. However, the opinion survey that I
conducted reveals that brand owners are becoming more aware of the role of trademarks.
133. See BELINDA ISAAC, BRAND PROTECTION MATTERS 1-25, 136-191 (2000)
(discussing the effect of various marketing and branding choices). See also JOHN MURPHY
& MICHAEL ROWE, HOW TO DESIGN TRADEMARKS AND LOGOS (1988) (examining the history
of different logos and their purposes).
134. See SANDOR, supra note 132, at 35 (referring to UNCTAD).
135. DEXTER BROOKS, Global Approach to Building Strong Trademarks, in STRATEGIC
ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND GLOBALIZATION ECONOMY 3, 5
(Thomas Cottier, Peter Widmer & Katharina Schindler eds., 1999). Dexter Brooks, a senior
staff council, legal division, at the Coca-Cola Company, Atlanta, USA, notes that, “CocaCola is the world’s best-known trade mark. The company is the world's leading marketer of
soft drink syrups and concentrates, with 1995 retail sales of $18 billion and a total sales
volume double that of our nearest competitor. . . . Coca-Cola is available in more than 195
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be expected, this religious connotation behind the Mecca-Cola brand has
also generated consumer interest among Muslims around the world.136
A helpful step towards raising the Trademark Potential of developing
countries, it would be useful to initially focus on existing national products.
Developing countries should invest in building and promoting domestic
brands covering national agricultural products. Such products might
include grains, cereals, vegetables, fruits, and textiles. Furthermore, local
consumers should be alerted that in some cases foreign brands cover
products of a similar quality to those covered by the local brands. For
example, in the case of the textile industry, consumers should be alerted to
the simple truth that many of the leading Western brands have been
engaged in outsourcing activities.137 Furthermore, many of the worldfamous (Western) coffee brand owners import their coffee from developing
countries (mainly Colombia).
Where commercially feasible, producers in developing countries
should “Go-Global” with their brands after identifying possible potential
markets for their products around the world. Producers in developing
countries should determine where to export their products and, by this, also
determine where to register their trademarks in order to receive adequate
protection for them.138
Similarly, consumers should be alerted to the existence of national
products, and they should be encouraged to appreciate their local products
and to view them with a sense of national pride. This way, consumers
might also begin to manifest preference to national brands as a microcosm
of national pride. In addition, producers should maintain a high level of
product quality and reliability so that the brands that they market under are
able to establish long lasting goodwill among local and international
consumers and to even raise the demand for such products.
Another way to boost the trademark competitiveness of developing
countries is to have those countries cooperate among themselves. This can
be done with a view to raising the quality and design of products,
countries; and company brands account for more than 45 per cent of all soft drinks sold
worldwide. . . . [W]e have in force at present 13,000 registrations throughout the world . . .
.” Id.
136. See Charles A. Rarick, Mecca-Cola: A Protest Brand Makes its Mark (Purdue
University Calumet, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122863
(“Mecca-Cola and other products have arisen in recent years in response to an increasing
anti-American and anti-globalization movement in certain parts of the world. This case
briefly explores this movement, with a focus on one company, Mecca-Cola, and asks
readers to explore the consequences for American multinational brands.”).
137. For example, Levi’s Corporation has reportedly shut down its last two production
factories in the U.S. and has relocated its production plants to the Far East.
138. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva,
Switz., Dec. 11-19, 1978, Report of the Ad hoc Group of Experts on the External Trade of
the Least Developed Countries, 6 (March 19, 1979).
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improving quality of labor, investing in research and development
(“R&D”), and understanding international export markets.
In the context of trademarks, this cooperation may be achieved by
establishing “Regional Trademark Preferential Zones.” The aim of such
zones would be to promote regional trademarks and service marks, and to
encourage their use. In addition, such zones would ideally allow for fast
track registration of national marks in other partner countries and would
even allow for a common registration system. In such a system, a valid
trademark registration in one member-state would be considered a valid
registration in other member-states.139 Furthermore, developing countries
may elect to diversify their imports by shifting from Western industrialized
countries to other developing countries. In this way, the Trademark Deficit
and the Trademark Balance of developing countries would be greatly
improved. This, in turn, may contribute to the consumers’ awareness of the
existence of various brands for similar products, and consumers would be
less inclined to focus on a limited number of leading brands. Clearly, in
order for all of these actions to succeed, it is necessary for the regulator to
create an apt legal setting and to engage in legislative activity towards this
end. Furthermore, the governments of developing countries are required to
launch national awareness campaigns that are intended to protect the use
and registration of domestic marks.
4.6 Raising Antitrust Protection in Developing Countries
While developing countries have enhanced intellectual property
protection in their jurisdictions, they have not passed sufficiently vibrant
competition laws. Developing countries generally lack sophisticated
competition safeguards to counter-balance foreign intellectual property
rights. Indeed, while protection of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) is
injected into the legal and administrative systems of developing countries,
mainly through TRIPS, those countries generally lack a competition policy
system that can “prevent and remedy possible abuses by IPRs right
holders.”140
Maniatis, who makes this distinction, contends that,
“consumers want choice and information, in the case of competitive
markets, and regulation covering prices, quality, penalties and
139. In the context of this research, it would be possible to claim that in view of the
findings, a “Trademark Union” or “Free Trade Market Area” could be a reasonable countermeasure to the domination of the market by Western brands. Here too, the deviation from
the MFN principle (as prescribed by TRIPS) may arguably be a form of “affirmative action”
or “corrective discrimination.”
140. CARLOS M. CORREA, U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., THE STRENGTHENING OF IPRS IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
AND
COMPLIMENTARY
LEGISLATION
2
(2000),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/AboutDFID/files/itd/ip
rcl.pdf.
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compensation, in the case of markets where competition is absent.”141 This
observation is especially true given that consumers in developed countries
are better informed and are more exposed to their national brands, while,
on the other hand, consumers in developing countries are exposed to
foreign brands and the cultural values that they encompass without any
noticeable domestic competition. Thus, it might be possible to counterbalance the power of foreign brands through antitrust legislation that would
authorize the governments of developing countries to intervene in
commercial activity that effectively creates brand monopolies.142 The need
for a proactive antitrust system in developing countries is an acute one.
This is especially because those countries are “particularly vulnerable to
inappropriate intellectual property systems.”143
Invoking such antitrust measures could be based on article 40(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement that is intended to mitigate the exploitation of market
power. That article includes a non-exhaustive list of potentially abusive
licensing practices including exclusive grant-back conditions and coercive

141. Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in INTELL.
PROP. AND MARKET FREEDOM 65, 119-20 (Persp. on Intell. Prop. vol. 2) (Adrian Sterling
ed., Sweet & Maxwell Limited 1997). See also Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies,
48 EMORY L.J. 367, 478-80 (1999) (arguing that trademark protection necessarily leads to
anticompetitive losses).
142. See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 402 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003)
(“We conclude that antitrust doctrine is sufficiently supple, and sufficiently informed by
economic theory, to cope effectively with the distinctive-seeming antitrust problems
presented by the new economy–-the most striking example of the rise of intellectual
property to the pinnacle of the American economic system.”); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The
Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1979
(Univerity of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-46, Nov. 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 (noting that true conflicts between antitrust and
intellectual property are rare); Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual
Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2003) (arguing that
copyright and patent law can be effective vertical restraints); Rudolph J.R. Peritz,
Rethinking U.S. Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights 5 (New York Law School Public
Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, No. 22, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=719745 (describing the interplay between competition and policy
rights as seen in both antitrust and patent examples).
143. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
AND
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
4
(2003),
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf, (“[W]e consider
that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP system ‘wrong’ in a developing country are
likely to be far higher than in developed countries. Most developed countries have
sophisticated systems of competition regulation to ensure that abuses of any monopoly
rights cannot unduly affect the public interest. In the US and the EU, for example, these
regimes are particularly strong and well-established. In most developing countries this is far
from being case. This makes such countries particularly vulnerable to inappropriate
intellectual property systems.”).

KHOURYFINALIZED_TWO

398

3/31/2010 2:02:20 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:2

package licensing.144 It is understood to provide “considerable discretion to
WTO member states in specifying ‘. . . licensing practices or conditions
that may . . . constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights . . . .’”145
Some commentators contend that this article could be interpreted in a broad
manner so as to cover “abuse[s] of [intellectual property rights], including
monopoly pricing, refusals to license, effectuating horizontal cartels
through patent pooling, and exclusive vertical arrangements that forestall
competition.”146 This broad interpretation, which seems warranted given
the language and the rationale of article 40, should be sufficient to allow
developing countries to protect their local market and industry from
invasive or domineering foreign brands. This is notwithstanding the
specific protection that is provided by TRIPS to well-known marks.147
Indeed, although it would not be easy to substantiate the assertion that
article 40, broadly read, overrides such a specific provision that is plainly
set out in TRIPS, it is possible to reconcile them by stating that each article
addresses a specific issue. While the first is intended to protect marks that
enjoy world renown, the other is intended to curb abuse of the intellectual
property system and to facilitate market entry and competition.
4.7 Import Substitution
Raising the Trademark Potential of developing countries might also
be achieved through the diversification and expansion of domestic
production into areas that possess a higher Trademark Potential. In
essence, the aim here is to motivate the national economy to produce its
own national brands to effectively substitute foreign brands for local ones.
But, as a matter of fact, on the macro level the concept of national selfsufficiency is not new. Various developing countries, such as Mexico,
have experienced some success in their respective endeavors to establish a
viable and stable system of import substitution. However, that success has
been short-lived due to external pressures that have been brought to bear by
144. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, at 337, 33 I.L.M. 1197, at 1213 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market.”).
145. The WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries’ in a Millenium
Round, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 20-21, 1999, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property
Rights in Developing Countries: Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agreement,
(prepared by Keith E. Maskus & Mohamed Lehouel) 18.
146. Id.
147. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at 326 (incorporating Article 6bis of the
Paris Convention).
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industrialized countries citing concepts of free trade.148 In the first half of
the twentieth century, various developing countries attempted to exit this
vicious circle of “free trade” and to reduce their dependency on foreign
products and service by establishing substitutive national industries.149
This method is referred to as “Import Substitution” or “Import-Substituting
Industrialization.”150 Import substitution rejects the underlying concepts of
free trade and comparative advantage, which hold that specialization is
equally beneficial to both developed and developing countries. It also
rejects the approach that underlies the GATT Agreement, wherein the
expansion of international trade, to the benefit of all countries, is contingent
on the removal and promotion of intervention in the free market.151
Consequently, fundamental changes are warranted so that those developing
countries may achieve acceptable rates of growth, otherwise import
substitution would discontinue.152
148. See LESTER B. PEARSON ET AL., PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Praeger Publishers 1969) 4-6 (noting that
the idea of self sufficiency was also upheld by the Pearson Report of 1969 commissioned by
the UN International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). See also Christian
Joerges, Free Trade with Hazardous Products? The Emergence of Transnational
Governance with Eroding State Government (Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper LAW No.
2006/05, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908843 (discussing the weighing of
domestic concerns with free trade).
149. Constantine Michalopoulos, Developing Countries' Participation in the World
Trade Organization (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1906, 1998),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=620518; Magali Cowan & Melissa H. Birch, Trade
Strategies for Development: Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion (Darden Case
No. UVA-G-0393), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419317.
150. See HOWARD HANDELMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 231
(Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996) (describing the practice of import substituting industrialization as
reducing dependency on foreign imports by producing them at home). See also BEVERLY
M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 34-35 (1998) (stating
that in the middle of the past century (1940-1960), Mexico followed a policy of ‘import
substitution’ during which Mexico experienced an average annual growth of 6.4 percent in
its gross domestic production).
151. See NICOLAS LOCKHART & ANDREW D. MITCHELL, Regional Trade Agreements
under GATT 1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE
WTO 217 (Andrew D. Mitchell ed., Cameron May 2005) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=747984 (examining regional trade
agreement exceptions to GATT and their role in expanding trade); Gyoung-Gyu Choi, The
Optimal International Trade Agreement and its Enforcement under Asymmetric Information
3 (Sept. 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=46905 (noting that GATT was built
upon the assumption of the rule of free trade); Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO 10 (John M. Olin Law and Economic
Working Paper No. 228, Oct. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=604582
(describing Cordell Hull’s principles of free trade as shown through the 1934 Reciprocal
Trade Agreement).
152. See CARL, supra note 18, at 35-36 (referring to a study by Dr. Raul Prebisch (the
executive president of UNCTAD), Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: Report
of the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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Import substitution has been achieved in some countries through a
dual process of attracting investment (both foreign and domestic) and
placing restrictions on imports.153 Despite initial expenditures on inputs for
production, import substitution has allowed such countries to reduce the
scope of imports and to create new job opportunities domestically. Despite
its initial promise, this economic model has been short lived. Its collapse
began as early as the 1960s due to a host of reasons.154 First, the market for
consumer goods manufactured by these sheltered industries that practiced
import substitution were small, thus preventing manufacturers from taking
advantage of economies of scale.155 Second, the local industries in
developing countries lacked access to modern technology and their
production was slower, less efficient, and of a lesser quality. Third,
industrialized countries, spearheaded by the United States, viewed import
substitution as a direct threat against the international expansion of their
own industries on the world market and exerted pressure on developing
countries to abandon this system. This pressure was applied through
various channels including the World Bank, the IMF, the GATT-WTO, and
the Generalized System of Preferences.156
(UNCTAD), UN Econ., UN Doc. E/Conf. 46/3 at 6, 11-19 (1964)), in which Dr. Prebisch
added that GATT’s rules and principles are based on an “abstract notion of economic
homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial concerns
and peripheral countries with all their important implications.”).
153. See Marcelo De Paiva Abreu, Afonso S. Bevilaqua & Demosthenes M. Pinho,
Import Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890s-1970s 2 (Dec. 1996), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=45564 (describing the role of import substitution in Brazil’s coffee
export growth); Anne O. Krueger & Baran Tuncer, Microeconomic Aspects of Productivity
Growth under Import Substitution: Turkey 4 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper Series No. 532, Aug. 1980), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=263411
(arguing that non-traditional industries are not more dynamic than traditional industries and
therefore import substitution does not necessarily yield rapid long term growth).
154. See Diego Puga & Anthony J. Venables, Agglomeration and Economic
Development: Import Substitution Vs. Trade Liberalisation 2 (Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper No. 377, Nov. 1997, rev., Nov. 1998), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=74696 (noting that import substitution attracts a different sector of
industry than trade liberalization, which has consequences on the economic development of
the country); Douglas A. Irwin, Did Import Substitution Promote Growth in the Late
Nineteenth Century? 3 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No.
8751, Feb. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=299163 (questioning whether import
substitution promoted growth through shifting the employment from agriculture to
industrial, or whether the shift in employment itself was the catalyst for growth).
155. See CARL, supra note 18, at 35-36 (stating that by the 1960’s import substitution
was “exhausted” on the national level because the markets for the consumer goods of
protected industries were small and this limited market size “prevented manufacturers from
taking advantage of economies of scale.”).
156. See id. at 36-37 (noting that ultimately, these efforts bore fruit because the
governments of developing countries “were persuaded that the road to economic prosperity
and political stability was foreign trade”). The sum of these factors led some developing
countries, primarily East Asia’s newly industrialized countries (NICs), to shift their
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Another approach recognizes the importance of trade to economic
development and contends that developing countries should, rather than
export primary products, initiate a process of industrialization through
“backwards linkage, starting with light industry and concluding with
capital goods production.”157 This approach is referred to as the
“structuralist approach.”158 Thus, while neo-classical theorists claimed that
the benefits of trading between two countries would be distributed equally,
structuralists have asserted that the industrialized countries not only
retained their own productivity gains, but also absorbed a portion of
productivity generated from primary exports.159 Evidently, those that
oppose the school of comparative advantage share a perception whereby
“fostering state owned enterprises is essential both to protect national
independence and to develop new industries.”160 In this regard, one
commentator notes that “the only long term hope of developing countries is
to replace imported goods by domestic products and to create conditions
enabling their national economy to meet local demand without resorting to
foreign resources.”161 As alluded to above, when a wider variety of
products are domestically produced in a certain country, national brands
emphasis “away from import substitution over to export expansion” also referred to as
Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI). Id. Consequently, developing countries began to
reduce their tariffs and to increase their imports of manufactured products with a high
trademark potential thus increasing their trademark deficit. Id. The steps undertaken by
developing countries with respect to their abandonment of import substitution were not
reciprocated by developed countries. While sixty developing nations were working (during
the late 1980s) on reducing their trade restrictions, twenty of the top twenty-four
industrialized nations were raising their trade barriers. Id. This is further testimony to the
structural bias in the global trading system. Carl also explained that a number of developing
countries, especially Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, dramatically reduced their tariffs and
increased imports. Id. at 36-37. See also HANDELMAN, supra note 150, at 234 (explaining
that “East Asia’s NICs initiated their industrialization drive through import substitution, just
as their Latin American counterparts had done years earlier. Soon, however, they
diversified into manufacturing for export. Early protectionism measures were phased out,
thereby forcing local companies to become more competitive. State agencies shaped the
market, pressuring manufacturers and offering them incentives to export. By 1980,
manufactured goods constituted over 90 percent of all South Korean and Taiwanese exports,
while representing only 15 percent in Mexico and 39 percent in Brazil. Fueled by their
dynamic industrial export sectors, East Asia’s booming economies, have become the envy
of the developing world.”) (citations omitted). Interestingly, some research argues that the
experience of East Asia’s NICs in Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) was a positive
one. Id.
157. CARL, supra note 18, at 36.
158. Id.
159. See id. (“The elasticity of demand were low for primary products, while the
developed countries’ exports (especially manufacturers) enjoyed relatively high elasticities
of demand.”).
160. Id. at 35-36, n.110.
161. SANDOR, supra note 132, at 24 (referring to conclusions reached by the Pearson
Report, at 80).
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gain a better footing in the market, thus improving the Trademark Potential
and ultimately the Trademark Balance of a country. In my view, altering
the Trademark Balance through import substitution in developing countries
necessitates overcoming various structural hurdles as to the impact of
brands including inept laws, stagnation in industrial production, narrow
economic outlooks, and education gaps.
Indeed, in order to succeed in import substitution, it is imperative to
gear national industry towards this end. Import substitution requires a
thorough review of import practices by developing countries. They need to
determine the exact nature of imports and to attempt to substitute such
imports with local products bearing domestic brands. This will contribute
towards raising the Trademark Potential of the country and in improving
its Trademark Balance.
4.8 Prospects for Assistance by Other Entities
Developing countries will, most likely, not be able to single-handedly
amend their trademark régimes, especially in light of the current
concentration of economic and political powers in the hands of WesternIndustrialized countries--namely the United States and some Western
European countries. For this reason, developing countries are in need of a
“policy space” in order to strike a new balance with their respective
national intellectual property systems.162 One study concludes that
developing countries may gain a stronger footing in the reformulation of
intellectual property standards by receiving assistance from other parties
and by collaborating with each other. Thus, the question that presents itself
here is: From whom can developing countries receive assistance in this
regard?163

162. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 830
(2007) (contending that if countries are to benefit from their intellectual property systems,
they need to strike the right balance between proprietary interests and public access needs in
their intellectual property system and to strike the right balance, countries need wide policy
space—or, in political terms, autonomy and sovereign discretion--to design their intellectual
property system); see also Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for
Development, 4 (The Ctr. for Int’l Governance and Innovation, Working Paper No. 37,
2008) (noting that the adoption of a “Development Agenda” by the WTO has given less
developed countries a unique opportunity to reshape the international intellectual property
system).
163. See Yu, Building International Property Coalitions for Development, supra note
162, at 4 (finding that, by bringing countries together, “coalitions will have leverage that
does not exist for each less developed country alone,” and, “if used strategically, they will
allow less developed countries to shape a pro-development agenda, articulate more coherent
positions, or even enable them to establish a united negotiating front.”). Yu further found
that these coalitions will “also help less developed countries establish a more powerful voice
in the international debates on public health, intellectual property, and international trade,”
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First, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) can play a vital
supporting role for developing countries. This is because various NGOs
have demonstrated their ability to rally the masses and to influence Western
public opinion. Thus, a coordinated effort between developing countries
and NGOs may ultimately tip the balance and allow for entering changes
into the trademark régime. However, despite the potential for such
cooperation, its success is not assured because “these kinds of coalitions
are difficult to put together, are issue specific and predominantly rely on a
crisis of some kind to be truly effective. They do not threaten the standardsetting dominance of the US and EU, especially when these two states are
united on the direction in which global regulation should travel.”164
Similarly, the Council of TRIPS may be asked to play a more active
role in addressing cases of excessive domination by foreign trademarks and
service marks. Article 68 of TRIPS allows member-states to consult on
“matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights.”165 Article 71(1) of TRIPS also empowers the council to review the
implementation of the agreement “in the light of any relevant new
developments which might warrant modification or amendment of this
[a]greement.”166 These authorities could be interpreted as granting the
council the authority to inquire with states that are “seeking to raise
intellectual property [protection] standards beyond those agreed to
multilaterally.”167 In this type of review process, developing countries
could initiate consultations regarding the effects of trademarks and their
contribution to achieving real globalization and free trade. Such a
consultation process within the Council of TRIPS might revive the debate
regarding the future form and content of TRIPS generally and trademarks
specifically.168
and that “instead of focusing on state-to-state relationships, less developed countries need to
better understand the importance and challenges for working with non-governmental
organizations and sub-state agents and within non-national systems.” Id. at 10.
164. Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-setting, 5 J. WORLD INTEL. PROP. 765, 768 (2002).
165. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, Article 68 (“The Council for TRIPS shall
monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in particular, Members’ compliance with their
obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on matters
relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. It shall carry out such
other responsibilities as assigned to it by the Members, and it shall, in particular, provide
any assistance requested by them in the context of dispute settlement procedures. In
carrying out its functions, the Council for TRIPS may consult with and seek information
from any source it deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO, the Council shall seek to
establish, within one year of its first meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation with
bodies of that Organization”).
166. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at Article 8.
167. Drahos, supra note 164, at 794.
168. See Ralph Cunningham, Policing the World of Intellectual Property, TRIPS
Council–-Special Report, in WORLD IP CONTACTS HANDBOOK 18, 20-21 (2002) (explaining
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In addition to the Council of TRIPS, the WTO Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (“TPRM”) might be another suitable forum in which
developing countries can raise issues regarding possible distortions in trade
that are being caused by the CTR. TPRM might be petitioned in view of
the aforementioned unilateralism by the US and EU. Indeed, according to
Drahos, TPRM has “broader implications for the stability of the WTO
system.”169 Consequently, developing countries may initiate an in-depth
review of the trade-related effects of trademark protection on their
economies, imports, exports, industry, the consumer market, and the
national culture.
Developing countries might also elect to forge an economic-political
alliance which would constitute a counter-balance to the influential “Quad”
of industrialized countries that formulated TRIPS.170 Indeed, by pooling
their efforts, developing countries should be more effective in amending
their respective trademark régimes. Such pooling of resources would allow
developing countries to dispatch joint delegations that specialize in health,
environment, law, trade, economics, and agriculture. Indeed, some
commentators blame this lack of coordination for the failure of developing
countries in the negotiations leading up to TRIPS.171
In addition, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
can play a crucial role in reviving the intellectual property debate. This is
in spite of the fact that developed countries have been successful in shifting
the forum from WIPO to WTO-TRIPS. WIPO commands substantial
international respect and credibility that allows it to play a more effective
role in revitalizing the debate over intellectual property and development,
rather than just focusing on promoting intellectual property protection.
4.9 The Challenge of Compatibility with TRIPS
Many of the abovementioned proposed solutions within the middle
ground approach could potentially clash with the principles underlying the
TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, it appears as though remedying some of the
negative effects of TRIPS in the context of trademarks by providing
that these conflicting positions are reported in a briefing note published by the WTO before
the Ministerial Council that was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001).
169. Drahos, supra note 164, at 795. This doubt surrounding the effectiveness of the
TPRM in this context is more clearly apparent in view of the fact that the objectives of the
TPRM include an “‘increased transparency and understanding of countries trade policies’ as
well as ‘to create a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading
system.’” Id. (quoting the WTO Website).
170. See Drahos, supra note 164, at 794-795 (suggesting that the four countries that
should form this counter-quad are India, Brazil, Nigeria, China).
171. See id. (noting that developing countries can join such a constellation and contribute
their share within).
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preferential treatment to brands originating in developing countries would
clash with various norms prescribed by TRIPS, including the principles of
National Treatment (Article 3) and Most Favored Nation (Article 4), which
I have dealt with in Section Two above. But in addition to these two
hurdles, the TRIPS agreement presents other hurdles, including those
appearing in articles 8 and 72 of that Agreement.
Article 8(2) of TRIPS allows member-states to take measures against
abuse of intellectual property right holders on the condition that “[such
measures] are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”172 In
other words, member-states can only maneuver “freely” within the
parameters of measures that are prescribed by TRIPS. In light of this
limitation, it would be difficult to establish that trademark protection, as
prescribed by TRIPS, would in fact result in the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or “unreasonably restrain trade or adversely
affect the international transfer of technology.”173 Consequently, there is a
need to first recognize such a possibility by the TRIPS Agreement. In this
regard, Article 72 of TRIPS makes it exceedingly difficult for any memberstate to independently modify any of the TRIPS norms because it plainly
states that “reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the
provisions of this [a]greement without the consent of other Members.”174
Understandably, such consent is not easy to come by. Therefore, Article 72
also needs to be amended in order to allow a member-state to enter
unilateral reservations pertaining to the trademark régime where its national
interests dictate this. However, allowing this would effectively undermine
the uniformity of TRIPS.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
In light of the Trademark Potential concept, it appears that presently,
the CTR is beneficial to some countries and much less so to other
countries. Thus, although CTR is intended to provide equal protection to
all brands, whether domestic or foreign, the equality in the commercial
foothold of brands is not attained. My previous research has demonstrated
that the effects of the CTR on developing countries contribute towards
creating a Trademark Deficit in those countries.
In this research, I have explored various possible ways of modifying
the CTR in developing countries that are also considered to be newcomers
172. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at Article 8 (stating that “appropriate
measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this agreement, may be
needed to prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”).
173. Id.
174. Id. at Article 72.
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in the brand-owning arena. In other words, while the modern trademark
régime contributes towards the entry of more foreign brands into
developing countries, it does not, and cannot, sufficiently facilitate the
creation of national brands therein.
Absent any intervention, the
Trademark Deficit of these countries will be preserved.
Consequently, I have introduced and examined new methods that are
intended to offset the differences among countries. Indeed, in view of this
imbalance in the end-result and in order to remedy it, two possible courses
of action for change come to mind. The first avenue is that of delinking
from the CTR. In its most extreme form this might involve the abolition of
the CTR in its entirety. I have rejected this approach and asserted that it
would be counter-productive to society at large. I have also equally
rejected the unequivocal support for the CTR because it fails to take into
consideration the differences among different countries. However, in the
borderline between those two extremes I have identified and devised a host
of amendments, which I have referred to collectively as the NeoConventional Trademark Régime (“NCTR”). In my view, the mechanisms
that are included in the NCTR reflect the recognition that while trademark
protection must be preserved, changes are required in order to assist
newcomer states to effectively participate in the trademark game.
In a nutshell, this research proposes various methods through which
the existing Trademark Deficit of developing countries can be
counterbalanced in a manner that might assist these newcomer countries to
penetrate the seemingly impregnable wall that separates the “haves” from
the “have-nots” in the trade-marking (branding) domain.

